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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Back Ground of Study 
The European Union (EU) was formed so as to maintain peace and to unify Europe in a bid to 
ensure that the events caused by the Second World War would never be repeated again.1 The 
idea was to bring the nations together both economically and politically and to ensure long 
lasting peace.2 
The EU, as we know it today was the brain child of Robert Schuman, who first introduced by 
the Schuman Declaration in 1950. The Schuman Declaration became the heart of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951.3 The EU was subsequently created through a 
number of treaties with each Treaty and agreement bringing economic and political unity. The 
treaties of Rome signed in 1957 fostered economic cooperation.4 The Single European Act 
gave birth to the Common Market thus economic unity to the member states, completing the 
four freedoms, the freedom of movement of goods, services, people and money.5 The 
Maastricht treaty of 1992 created the EU because it addressed the measures of security and 
defence as well as home affairs.6 These treaties were followed by the Amsterdam (1997), Nice 
(2001) and the Lisbon (2007) treaties, while the community grew from original 6 members to 
having 28 member states.7 
The United Kingdom (UK) joined the EU in 1973, fifteen years after the original members 
launched the 0Economic Community (EEC) and almost twenty five years after the ground 
                                                          
1 Cini M & Borrogan N P S European Union Politics 5ed (2016) 2. 
2 Fontaine P ‘Europe in 12 Lessons’ (2006) available at 
https://europa.rs/images/publikacije/26-EU_In_12_Lessons.pdf accessed on 05/05/2017). 
3 The history of the European Union 
 http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/index_en.htm (accessed on 05/05/ 2016). 
4 Dinan D Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration 3rd ed (2005) 2. 
5 Fontaine P ‘Europe in 12 Lessons’ (2006) available at 
https://europa.rs/images/publikacije/26-EU_In_12_Lessons.pdf accessed on 05/05/2017). 
6 ‘European Law Monitor’ available at http://www.europeanlawmonitor.org/treaties/eu-
treaties-treaty-on-european-union-maastricht-treaty-of-nice-lisbon-treaty.html  (accessed on 
05/05/2016). 
7 Fontaine P ‘Europe in 12 Lessons’ (2006) available at 
https://europa.rs/images/publikacije/26-EU_In_12_Lessons.pdf accessed on 05/05/2017). 
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breaking Schuman Declaration.8 The UK is short for The United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland. The UK is made up of four states; England, Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland.9 For a variety of cultural, historical, and political reasons the UK public and political 
opinion was largely uninterested in the supranational EU legal order.10 A supranational order 
is an order whereby an international organisation or union in which member states transcend 
national boundaries or interests to share in the decision making and vote on issues pertaining 
to the wider grouping.11  
Since 1973 the UK has enjoyed the benefits that come with the membership of the EU.12 As a 
member of the EU, the UK has contributed significantly towards a closer foreign and defence 
policy cooperation and greater market integration.13 The UK has thus far implemented the rules 
and the regulations in keeping with the adherence of international obligations.14 However a 
close analysis of the actions of the UK shows a slow but deliberate move away from the EU.15 
This is because while the UK is in support of the EU, it has long since resisted the institutional 
arrangements to deepen political and economic integration along the lines favoured by most 
member states in the EU.16 
Recently the UK announced its desire to renegotiate its terms with the EU or an exit from the 
EU in terms of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty being led by its Prime Minister David 
                                                          
8 Dinan D Origins and Evolution of the European Union: the New European Series (2014) 
306. 
9 Johnson B ‘The UK & Great Britain - What's the Difference?’ 
http://www.historic-uk.com/HistoryUK/HistoryofBritain/The-UK-Great-Britain-Whats-the-
Difference/ (accessed on 29/04/2016). 
10 George S An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community 3rd ed (1998) ch 2. 
11 ‘Supranational’ available at http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/supranational.asp 
(accessed on 04/07/2016). 
12 Minford P, Gupta S, Phuong Mai Le V Should Britain Leave the EU? An Economic 
Analysis of a Troubled Relationship 2nd ed (2015) 23. 
13 Andrew G Britain and the European Union: The European Union Series (2013) 174-196. 
14 Wall S A strange Europe: Britain and the EU from Thatcher to Blair 1st ed (2008) 5. 
15 Oliver T ‘A European Union without the United Kingdom: The Geopolitics of a British 
Exit from the EU Strategic’ http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/A-EU-
without-the-UK-LSE-IDEAS-Strategic-Update.pdf (accessed on 13/06/2016). 
16 Dinan D Origins and Evolution of the European Union: the New European Series 2014 
OUP Oxford 306. 
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Cameron.17 In his election campaign the Prime Minister promised to renegotiate the terms of 
British membership and lay out a referendum on 23 June 2016. The referendum resulted in a 
win for the exit camp with a 52% win.18 This vote also saw David Cameron stepping down as 
prime minister as he had promised before the referendum was held. At the time of writing the 
UK is still in the process of negotiating a possible exit package from the EU.19  
1.2 Problem Statement 
The possibility of member states exiting the EU will have an impact on the country which 
decides to leave, EU as a whole and third parties. The exit of the UK from the EU will not only 
affect the future UK-EU relationship but UK-third party relationships. Developing countries 
especially those in Africa stand to lose preferential access to the UK market and developmental 
aid which is a cause for concern.  
This mini thesis will be guided by the following research questions 
1. The history, origin and legal interpretation of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty which 
allows for a member State to leave the EU. 
2. The approach the Brexit followed in utilising Article 50 and conditions needed to 
implement Article 50. 
3. The legal implication of a possible Brexit in terms of Article 50 on the EU legal order 
and third parties in the form of developing countries. 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
This study is being conducted in the light of the proposed exit of the UK from the EU. This 
mini thesis is aimed at providing a mirror as to the advantages, disadvantages of regional 
integration. This research serves to show an example of how an integration model may become 
unsustainable due to the differences of interests of the members of a regional block. This mini 
thesis is to be used as a tool for further discussion on regional integration.  
                                                          
17 Matthijs M ‘Dangerous Game: The Folly of Flirting with an EU exit’ (2013) 92 Foreign 
Affairs Journal 516. 
18 Wheeler B and Hunt A ‘The UK’s referendum: All you need to know’ BBC News 24 June 
2016 available at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887 (accessed on 10/ 07/2016). 
19 What next after the UK vote to leave the EU? 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.za/2016/06/what-next-after-uk-vote-to-leave-eu.html 
(accessed on 10/07/2016). 
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For a long time Africa has looked at the EU as the model for regional integration thus it is 
important to learn from the history of others so as to make a more efficient and long standing 
model for regional integration of Africa. This study can therefore be used by Africa so as to 
see the possible conflict that may arise due to integration so as to guard against the same. This 
study will also add to the academic research on the exit of a member state from the EU, the 
procedure and the possible hindrances to a successful exit.   
1.4 Methodology  
A theoretical approach to the research will be undertaken to arrive at an answer of the research 
question. This research would rely entirely on materials available from various primary sources 
including textbooks, national legislation, international and regional agreements that propose 
trade facilitation and liberalisation of trade in goods. These include: the policy documents on 
the EU as well as sources on the British foreign policy, recommendations and reports. 
Secondary sources such as journal articles, academic textbooks, and commentary reports of the 
negotiation processes undertaken by the member countries of the EU, newspaper articles and 
internet sources will be also used. 
1.5 Chapter Outline 
Chapter 1  
This will be an introductory chapter which will provide an overview of the background to the 
study, the problem, the significance of the study and the methodology. 
Chapter 2 
This chapter looks at the history of the EU integration, history and the origin of Article 50  
Chapter 3  
This chapter will seeks to highlight the UK approach to the exit, a theoretical framework of 
analysis of Article 50 and the application of Article 50 in the UK domestic system 
Chapter 4 
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This chapter seeks find possible legal implications of a possible Brexit in terms of Article 50 
on the legal systems of the UK, the EU and third parties in the form of developing countries in 
Africa 
Chapter 5 
This chapter is the conclusion of the discussion which will consist of an opinion and possible 
recommendations with regard to the way forward with the legal framework for the UK exit 
from the EU. 
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Chapter 2: History of the European 
Union Integration  
2.1 Introduction 
The European Union (EU) is a culmination of the great Schuman plan and a number of various 
agreements. The proposed British exit from the EU vexed and perplexed many.20 One must, 
however, take into cognisance the position of Britain within the EU as its application to the EU 
initially was rejected by France twice.21 In addition to the above, Britain had Euro sceptic views 
subsequent to its accession into the EU.22 Britain has thus earned the name ‘an awkward 
partner’.23 The process of exiting EU was unused until the UK recently indicated that they 
wished to exit the EU thus there are still areas of uncertainty in the exit procedure. It is therefore 
imperative that a closer look at Article 50 Treaty of the European Union (TEU) be taken so as 
to attain legal certainty.  
This chapter will explore the history of the European integration process. This will assist in 
unravelling the complexities surrounding the emergence of the EU. The chapter also seeks to 
bring light to the various dimensions of the European integration and its goals. It also seeks to 
explore the origin of Article 50 of the TEU, what it entails and the changes it brought to the 
International climate. Furthermore, the chapter endeavours to explore the workings of Article 
50, its interpretation, theoretic framework and the ambiguity of Article 50. The aim is to bring 
context to the phenomenon of an exit from the EU and check whether member states had the 
freedom to leave the EU prior to Article 50.  
2.2 History of European Integration 
  
                                                          
20 Cassidy J ‘Why the Remain Campaign Lost the Brexit Vote’ 24 June 2016 The New 
Yorker available at http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/why-the-remain-
campaign-lost-the-brexit-vote (accessed on 07/09/2016). 
21 Petit G ‘Britain’s demands of the EU: a view from France’ 18 February 2016 The 
Conversation available at http://theconversation.com/britains-demands-of-the-eu-a-view-
from-france-54964 (accessed on 11/09/2016). 
22 Davis R ‘Euroscepticism and Opposition to British Entry into the EEC, 1955-75’ available 
https://rfcb.revues.org/1364 (accessed on 12/09/2016). 
23 George S An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community 2nd Edition 1994 52. 
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The 1950s represented a critical juncture for ideas concerning the political order and the 
construction of EU.24 As of 1950, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) began to 
unite European countries economically and politically to secure lasting peace. The ECSC 
proposed coordinated steel and coal production between France and Germany.25 The six 
founding member states were Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands.26 This plan signalled the re-entry of Germany into peacetime Europe and is 
considered to be the most important date in the history of European unification.27 The idea was 
to facilitate competing interests and balance out a potential rise of a powerful state and enemy, 
for example, the rising Germany.28  
2.2.1 From peace to a single market 
ECSC marked an important juncture in European history, whereby national governments in 
Europe agreed to delegate part of their sovereignty, opting for a new and novel type of 
international organisation. The world leaders for the first time allowed a supranational 
organisation to control important policy areas, choosing an authority enjoying executive 
powers to take decisions in the interest of all six countries.29 This marked a unique turning 
point in European history and set in motion a process of European unification that continues to 
this date.  
Furthermore, the ECSC provided an organisational framework that allowed for the 
involvement of other European countries as well.30 In the year 1950, the French government 
proposed the establishment of a European Defence Community (EDC).31 This project was 
aborted in 1954 when the French Legislative Assembly vetoed its application. The EDC which 
implied a strong military and political integration was substituted by the Western European 
                                                          
24 The history of the European Union available at https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/history_en (accessed on 07/09/2016). 
25 Armstrong D The Rise of the International Organisation: A Short History (1982) 75. 
26 The history of the European Union available at https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/history_en (accessed on 07/09/2016). 
27 Stuart L M The European Communities and the Rule of Law (1977) 9. 
28 Ocana J ‘The History of the European Union, the European Citizenship’ Historiasiglo 
available at 
http:www.historiasiglo20.org/Europe/traroma.htm (accessed 12/11/2016). 
29 Toepke U P ‘The European Economic Community - A Profile’ (1981) 6 Northwestern 
Journal of International Law & Business 2. 
30 Ocana J ‘The History of the European Union, the European Citizenship’ Historiasiglo 
available at  
http:www.historiasiglo20.org/Europe/traroma.htm (accessed 12/09/2016).  
31 Armstrong D The Rise of the International Organisation: A Short History (1982) 78. 
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Union (WEU).32 Since the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and WEU overlap, the 
WEU has a minor role in European defence. In spite of this mishap, the integration process 
went on.33  
In 1957, two treaties were signed in Rome which became known as the Treaties of Rome 
creating the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC)34 and the European 
Economic Energy Community (EURATOM).35 The EEC was aimed at establishing a common 
market abolishing barriers to trade. The common market in goods liberalisation meant 
streamlining or elimination of border formalities and the harmonisation of Value Added Tax 
(VAT) rates within wide bands.36 It also meant the liberalisation of government procurement, 
harmonisation and mutual recognition of technical standards in production, packaging and 
marketing.37 While the EURATOM, on the other hand was aimed at creating conditions for the 
development of a strong nuclear industry.38 The Treaties of Rome successfully laid the 
foundation for ‘ever closer union39 and the idea that member states should give economic 
support to each other to help all countries to grow at a similar rate. At this point one sees the 
European Community blossom into an organism of supranational character in constant 
evolution towards greater unity in virtually all aspects of life.40 
The creation of the EEC effectively created what is known as a Free Trade Area (FTA). The 
EECs’ customs union and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) were completed in 1968. The 
removal of capital controls and the free movement of people caused deeper capital market 
integration.41 This EFTA created new political pressures for other countries to join the 
community as trade diversion creates force for inclusion. Thus, we see more countries joining 
                                                          
32 Armstrong D The Rise of the International Organisation: A Short History (1982) 78. 
33The History of the European Union: The Citizenship available at 
http://www.historiasiglo20.org/europe/anteceden2.htm (accessed on 07/09/ 2016). 
34 Stuart L M The European Communities and the Rule of Law (1977) 9. 
35 The History of the European Union: The European Citizenship available at 
http://www.historiasiglo20.org/europe/anteceden2.htm (accessed on 07/09/ 2016). 
36 Baldwin C & Wyplose Economics of European Integration 2nd ed (2006) 21 
37 Baldwin C & Wyplose Economics of European Integration 2nd ed (2006) 21. 
38 Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 167, Article 1 
39 Treaty of Rome (EEC) available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3Axy0023 accessed on 09/09/2016). 
40 Toepke U P ‘The European Economic Community - A Profile’ (1981) 6 Northwestern 
Journal of International Law & Business 2. 
41 European Union (EU) available at http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/small/Eq-
Inc/European-Union-EU.html (accessed on the 07 September 2016). 
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the EU, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the European Union on 1 January 
1973, raising the number of member states to nine.42 In 1981, Greece became the 10th member 
of the EU, and Spain and Portugal followed five years later showing a steady growth of the 
European Community.  
In 1986, the Single European Act (SEA) was signed and entered into force on 1 July 1987. The 
SEA sets forth several means of achieving European unity. It was aimed at speeding up the 
process of the European construction so as to complete the internal market.43 The SEA dealt 
with the involvement of the Community in new fields, the development of a unified economic 
and monetary policy, a strengthening of economic and social cohesion, and the coordination of 
actions relating to the environment and foreign policy.44 The SEA provided the basis for a vast 
six-year programme aimed at dealing with issues of the free flow of trade across EU borders 
creating the ‘Single Market’.45 This effectively broke down trade barriers such as taxes, import 
and export taxes were made uniform.  
2.2.2 From an economic union to a political union  
In 1993, the Single Market was completed with the 'four freedoms': movement of goods, 
services, people and money. The 1990s were also the decade of two treaties: the Maastricht 
Treaty on European Union (The Maastricht Treaty) in 1993 and Treaty of Amsterdam 
amending the Treaty of the European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts (Amsterdam Treaty) in 1999. The Maastricht Treaty 
declared a new economic phase, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).46 What this meant 
was that there would be a single currency between the members of the EU.47 The idea to 
integrate monetary systems had already been expressed in the treaty of Rome, where it stated 
that each member state considers its own policy on the change of exchange rate as a common 
                                                          
42 Armstrong D The Rise of the International Organisation: A Short History (1982) 75. 
43 Single European Act 17 February 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, 25 I.L.M. 506. 
44 Good K ‘Institutional Reform under the Single European Act’ (1988) 3 American 
University International Law Review 8. 
45 Fontaine P ‘The European Union Explained: Europe in 12 Lessons’ Europa 2014 available 
at http://europa.eu/pol/index_en.htm (accessed on 07/09/2016). 
46European Union (EU) available at http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/small/Eq-
Inc/European-Union-EU.html (accessed on the 07 September 2016). 
47 Rose A & Engel C ‘Currency Unions and International Integration’ (2002) 34 Journal of 
Money, Credit, and Banking 3. 
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matter.48 The EMU needed to go past three steps in order for it to be successful, firstly the 
completion of the creation of a common market and economic stabilisation on convergence 
criteria.49 The second stage is the establishment of institutions that would prepare countries for 
the adoption of a common currency.50 The last phase is the adoption of a common currency 
and become a basis for the foundation of the European Bank.51  
The main aim of the Amsterdam Treaty was to modify certain regulations of the Treaty of the 
European Union namely the Paris and Rome Treaties.52 Its main areas of emphasis were 
increasing the democratic legitimacy of the European Institutions,53 achieved by increasing the 
powers of the European Parliament, Security and Justice Reforms. Furthermore, the Treaty 
included the introduction of a common foreign and security policy and the reformation of the 
three pillars of the EU.54 It is also evident that the Amsterdam Treaty sought to reform the 
institutions in order to better prepare them for the accession of more member states in the 
upcoming enlargement.55  
In 1995, the EU gained three more new members: Austria, Finland and Sweden. The new 
members were all ‘rich’ countries, whereas in the two preceding rounds with Greece in 1981 
and Portugal and Spain in 1986 ‘poor’ countries had acceded to the EU.56 The accession process 
                                                          
48Lymbouris C ‘The Treaty of Amsterdam’ available at 
http://testpolitics.pbworks.com/w/page/20734325/The%20Treaty%20of%20Amsterdam 
(accessed on 08/09/2017). 
49 Davulis G’ European Integration: Historical Aspects and Current Problems’ (2013) 3 
International Journals of Business, Humanities and Technology 6. 
50 Davulis G’ European Integration: Historical Aspects and Current Problems’ (2013) 3 
International Journals of Business, Humanities and Technology 6. 
51 Davulis G’ European Integration: Historical Aspects and Current Problems’ (2013) 3 
International Journals of Business, Humanities and Technology 6. 
52Lymbouris C ‘The Treaty of Amsterdam’ available at 
http://testpolitics.pbworks.com/w/page/20734325/The%20Treaty%20of%20Amsterdam 
(accessed on 08/09/2017). 
53 Moravcsik A & Nicolaidis K ‘Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, 
Institutions’ (1999) 37 Journal of Common Market Studies 1 81.  
54 Piris J & Maganza G ‘The Amsterdam Treaty: Overview and Institutional Aspects’ (1998) 
22 Fordham International Law Journal 6 3. 
55 Lymbouris C ‘The Treaty of Amsterdam’ available at 
http://testpolitics.pbworks.com/w/page/20734325/The%20Treaty%20of%20Amsterdam 
(accessed on 8 January 2017). 
See also Meehan E ‘Citizenship and the European Union Rights: A Comparative Perspective’ 
(1996) 26 The Journal of Federalism 4. 
56 Breuss F ‘Austria, Finland and Sweden in the European Union’ (2003) 4 Austrian 
Economic Quarterly 131. 
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of this round lasted a minimum of three years and could last over five years, counting from the 
submission of the request for EU membership. The accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden 
brought the number of the EU members to fifteen.  
The following decade marked the most rapid growth of the EU. In the mid-1990s to around 
2004 the largest accession was set in motion. The joining members were the former Soviet bloc 
countries consisting of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia.57 In 2007 Bulgaria and Romania made their entrance into the European Community. 
2013 marked the entry of Croatia into the European discourse and to present day, the last and 
28th member of the EU. 
The Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community (Lisbon Treaty) (2007/C 306/01) was ratified by all EU countries 
including the UK before entering into force in 2009. The Treaty of Lisbon provided the EU 
with modern institutions and more efficient working methods. The Treaty of Lisbon amends 
the TEU and the Treaty establishing the EEC. In this process, the Rome Treaty was renamed 
to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).58 The stated aim of the treaty 
was to complete the process started by the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 and by the Treaty of 
Nice 2001 with a view to enhancing the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the Union and 
to improving the coherence of its action.59 This chapter intends to expand further on the Treaty 
of Lisbon in detail at a later stage as it will delve into the origin and the history of Article 50 
of the Treaty Establishing the European Union (TEU). 
It is clear from the above discussion that the EU like Rome was not built in a day. The EU was 
the result of gradual integration since the 1950s, an evolution when one level of union has been 
seen to work, giving confidence and motivation for a next level.60 Though sparked by the fear 
of future wars and single country domination, the EU evolved to become a great tool for 
European cooperation and a great economic platform for development. The aim of this 
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discussion is to show the kinds of agreements the UK is a part of as a member of the EU. This 
discussion is meant to also highlight the kind of agreements the UK is now opting out of and 
that the Brexit is not without consequence. 
Now that we have discussed the history of the EU, it is clear that Article 50 runs contrary to 
the goal of the EU for more integration and unity. This research seeks so show why this 
seemingly contrary idea of an exit was included and affected the EU legislation when it was 
clearly not a part of the original plan of integration. This chapter will now explore the advent 
of Article 50, how it came to being and why. It will go further to discuss Article 50 in depth 
and its areas of uncertainty. Discussing the history of Article 50 will help one to understand 
the intention and the meaning of Article 50 better.  
2.3 The advent of an exit clause  
 
While it is evident that EU integration was a gradual and purpose oriented towards an even 
closer cooperation of the European countries, the issue of state sovereignty remained a concern 
especially considering that there was no express exit clause from the EU.61 The issue of state 
sovereignty became a topical issue because while the idea of a closer economic unit and more 
economically friendly trade agreements was every attractive, member states still want to enjoy 
unfettered authority over their domestic policies.62 State sovereignty, due to the sovereignty of 
the EU law over domestic law63 seems to have been usurped thus the outcry for state 
sovereignty. The globalisation of the European market, the adoption of a single currency and 
the economic down turn that hit Europe and the increasing number of member states from six 
members to 28 brought a number of challenges.64 These challenges seemed to bring scepticism 
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towards the integration premise.65 It therefore only seemed logical that the Treaty of Lisbon be 
prepared with an allowance for leaving the EU if a member state chose to do so. 
2.3.1 Article 50  
Article 50 was not originally a part of the EU law but came about as amendment through the 
Lisbon Treaty. Before the enforcement of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU could be interpreted as 
a rock solid international organisation aimed at integration.66 The EU could be characterised as 
such because it successfully created the three fundamental common policies to harmonise every 
EU member state’s national interest, and went further to provide the negotiation platform to 
discuss and solve problems and differences.67  
However, this school of thought was no longer sustainable after the ratification of the Treaty 
of Lisbon, particularly Article 50. The inclusion of Article 50 instead suggests that 
disintegration could be another option and members may leave the bloc.68 Treaty of Lisbon 
amended empowers the EU to become a global actor by means of integration strategies that 
gather and collect the national power and interest from the member states of EU. However, 
Article 50 takes the EU in a novel direction which may ultimately weaken solidity.69 
The Lisbon Treaty amends two procedures that make it possible for a European state 
respectively to become, and to cease to be, a member of the EU. Since the establishment of the 
European Communities, the accession procedure currently provided in Article 49 TEU has 
been used many times, whereas Article 50 TEU remains a novel and not fully used nor 
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understood.70 The provisions outlining how states enter the EU and how they could leave the 
Union offer some insight into the notion of EU membership, and more generally into the nature 
of the EU legal order.71 In contrast to the accession procedure, the EU exit mechanism is only 
being put to test now for the first time due to the proposed exit by the UK. The exit procedure 
is subject to considerable scholarly scrutiny especially due to the UK referendum of 2016.72 
Article 50 is in stark contrast to the previous European Community orthodoxy, namely that 
withdrawal is politically, legally and practically impossible and as such, the previous treaties 
do not include a withdrawal clause.73 Seemingly, the main reason for refusing to acknowledge 
the possibility of withdrawal was to effectively ignore any criticism of the drive towards ‘an 
even closer union’ of Europe. It seems the idea of even contemplating the unilateral secession 
of a member State, was to risk this existential danger coming to fruition.74 Article 50 comes in 
and brings a new dimension to the EU bringing the possibility of an exit. 
Article 50 plays an important role in that it strengthens state sovereignty by allowing member 
states to exit the EU. The EU ceased to have vague exit procedures but rather opts for an open 
organisational structure in which member states have the sovereign right to leave therefore 
Article 50 shall now be discussed in depth. 
 2.3.2 Overview of the Framework for an exit in terms of Article 50 
The advent of Article 50 brought about legal changes and a framework for the process of an 
exit. Below is the content of Article 50. 
Article 50 – Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own 
constitutional requirements. 
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. 
In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and 
conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking 
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account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be 
negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified 
majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. 
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of 
the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in 
paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, 
unanimously decides to extend this period. 
4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council 
representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the 
European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it. A qualified majority shall be defined 
in accordance with Article 238(3) (b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to re-join, its request shall be subject to 
the procedure referred to in Article 49.75 
All these various aspects of Article 50 will be discussed in the section below. 
 
2.3.3 Exiting state as master of the exit process 
From the content of Article 50 it is apparent that an exit is not an event but it is rather a process. 
Section 1 of Article 50 points out that a member state may withdraw in accordance to its own 
constitutional requirements. Unpacking this section shows that Article 50 TEU acknowledges 
the possibility for any member State to withdraw from the Union under its own constitutional 
rules. However, the formulation of the provision suggests that it is not an absolute and 
immediate power on the part of the exiting member state to exit as they may please.76  
An overall look at Article 50 suggests that the decision to exit the EU is taken in accordance 
with the state’s domestic law, whereas EU law governs the departure itself.77 The EU exit 
procedure is therefore not based on ‘state primacy’ conception of the power to secede. By 
referring to any member State, instead of referring to the ‘High Contracting Parties’,78 Article 
50(1) TEU embeds the states’ ability to withdraw within the EU legal order. This seems to 
suggest that the success of any exit initiative therefore depends not only on the member’s 
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intention to leave. The success of the exit initiative also hinges on the fulfilment of the 
procedural and substantive requirements of Article 50 TEU. The exiting member state also 
must comply with the rules and principles underpinning the EU legal order more generally, 
under the control of the European Court of Justice. It becomes apparent that the states’ 
sovereign desire to exit the European community is not enough to exit but compliance with EU 
law is required one last time before the member state divorces itself from the influence of the 
EU. A question of interest would therefore arise in the case of the UK which does not have a 
codified constitution as to what would constitute ‘constitutional requirements’.79 
The first active move that a member state who seeks to exit the EU has to make is to notify the 
European Council of its intention to leave. Article 50(2) TEU states that the initiative to 
commence withdrawal proceedings belongs to the departing country. It however does not 
provide a deadline for filing the Notice, nor does it set out any requirements regarding its 
format. It seems that the departing country has the discretion to decide when and how to inform 
the others as to its intentions. The UK therefore cannot be forced to pull the trigger and hand 
in their Notice to withdraw from the EU to the EU Council but can indeed wait until it sees 
fit.80 In the case of the UK, the referendum was rather an advisory vote by the UK public but 
was not in itself the official Notice to withdraw from the EU.81 It is however unclear what, in 
formal terms, such a notification should look like or whether a mere announcement to the 
European Council would qualify as such a notification is sufficient as a Notice. It however 
seems generally accepted that the UK referendum result does not constitute notification of 
intention to withdraw.82 There is also a consensus that the Notice must be in the form of a 
diplomatic letter. It is rather a foretaste of what is to come but not a notification as will be 
explained in chapter 3 of this research. 
2.3.4 Format of the Notice of withdrawal 
The EU pre-accession experience could be used as a point of reference for the exit Notice’s 
structure. The pre-accession procedure commences with an application for membership, which 
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is a diplomatic letter expressing the desire to join the EU.83 The EU Notice may also take this 
format and be presented as a diplomatic letter to the European Council. A diplomatic letter sent 
by the UK Prime Minister to the European Council may be considered to constitute such a 
notification. The notification is likely to be in writing also considering Article 67(1) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) which requires a state that wants to invoke 
the Convention to withdraw from a treaty to notify the other parties in writing. 
Another area of uncertainty is who takes the responsibility of drafting the Notice of Intention 
to leave the EU and under what circumstances. It was generally assumed that the Prime 
Minister would render the Notice under prerogative powers;84 however this premise has been 
questioned. The question whether the Parliament should give its consent to the Prime Minister 
to give the Notice has gained currency after the referendum.85 The question whether the Prime 
Minister may trigger Article 50 and whether the Parliament should give its consent became the 
subject of a legal challenge at the High Court and the Supreme Court in the Miller case86 as 
will be further discussed in chapter 3. However, it is important to note that the content of the 
Notice of Intention to leave is determined by the domestic constitution of the member leaving 
the EU. 
Once the Notice of withdrawal has been received the European Council has to formulate a 
negotiating mandate. This mandate will be discussed by the remaining member states in the 
absence of the UK.87 This mandate will later be proposed to the UK and the negotiation of the 
withdrawal agreement will commence.88 Article 50 once again does not provide for a 
framework as to how the guidelines or the negotiating mandate will be adopted. The EU 
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negotiator, the European Commission, will then negotiate a withdrawal agreement with the UK 
considering the post Brexit relationship. The withdrawal agreement will be concluded by the 
EU Council by a qualified majority of 72% of participating states excluding the UK after 
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.89 Qualified majority voting is a system used 
for EU member states to reach an agreed position.  It is important to note that under the Lisbon 
Treaty, a majority must include 55 per cent of countries, representing 65 per cent of the total 
EU population. But Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union stipulates that the voting rule 
to be used is that set out in Article 238.3(b) of the TFEU, which requires 72 per cent of member 
states which in practice are 20 out of the remaining 27 member states, comprising 65 per cent 
of the EU population.90 
2.3.5 Prescription period for withdrawal 
Once a Notice of intention to leave has been given to the European Council, a prescription of 
two years starts to run. Once the UK has triggered the exit procedure through the notification 
it has two years to negotiate its exit package, failure of which would lead to automatic removal 
from the EU block.91 During these two years, the exiting member is to negotiate and conclude 
an agreement with the EU, the arrangements for withdrawal and a future relationship with the 
EU in terms Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
This seems to have been put in place to avoid animosity between the exiting member and the 
remaining members.92 It is worth noting that Article 8 of the Lisbon Treaty refers to the EU’s 
aim of developing special relationships with its neighbouring countries, to establish an area of 
prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by 
close and peaceful relations based on cooperation. Article 8 therefore provides room for a round 
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table discussion for continued coexistence between the UK and the EU post the Brexit.93 It is 
also important to note that Article 50 only compels the EU to seek a negotiation with the 
withdrawing member state not the exiting state. It therefore does not require the UK, or any 
withdrawing member state, to reciprocate.94 
The problem with the two-year threshold is that it is barely enough to make any meaningful 
agreement, given the overabundance of dossiers to negotiate.95 Thankfully this prescribed 
period for negotiation can be extended, however this can only be done if the European Council 
unanimously agree to the extension.96 The unanimous agreements requirement is not to be 
taken lightly considering the somewhat annoyance of other members for leaving the EU to 
begin with, worse still the UK has been accused of delaying to trigger the exit procedure.97 
This would explain the UK’s delay in triggering Article 50 as they would like to put their house 
in order and secure a clear plan for future relations with the EU. 
If a member of the EU within the two-year grace period fails to secure a withdrawal agreement 
and is not given an extension they are automatically ousted from the EU.98 Which seems to 
point to the fact that if a member state is not keen on a withdrawal agreement, the member can 
therefore let the two-year period elapse. Before the lapse of the two years, the withdrawal 
agreement or end of extension period the UK will still be regarded as a member of the EU 
during the withdrawal negotiations. The UK therefore has the option to negotiate its exit 
agreement with the remaining member states. 
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During the 2 year period, the UK will continue to participate in EU activities, the EU 
institutions and decision-making. But it will not take part or vote in any Council or European 
Council discussion concerning its withdrawal.99 The UK will be expected to continue as a 
member and existing EU law will continue to apply in the UK, and the UK will be bound by 
the principle of ‘sincere cooperation’.100 Gostyñska, however points out the fact that the UK 
position in the EU may not be so simple. Gostyñska says that it is disputable that the UK may 
remain actively involved in the EU during the transitional period. The full participation of the 
British delegation in EU decision-making, particularly in adopting EU law could encounter 
opposition from those member States with opposing agendas. It is, expected that a withdrawing 
member state should abide by a principle of sincere cooperation even though it already has one 
foot outside the EU which may result in a conflict of interest.101  
2.3.6 Status of the exiting member post the withdrawal agreement 
Finally, when all the procedural requirements have been met and the exiting member state has 
successfully left the EU bloc the member state may not simply change their minds and 
automatically opt back into the EU bloc.102 The member state would have to start the accession 
process de novo. All the rules of accession would therefore apply and the country will be 
regarded as a new member state requesting accession. It seems that Article 50 (5) was created 
as a deterrent used to ensure that member states do not take leaving the EU lightly and for 
political and practical reasons. It would be intolerable if member states could leave and come 
back at any point without consequence considering that the administrative and legal nightmare 
of having to change the structure and the legal content of the EU every single time a member 
state decided opt out and back in again.103 This was intended to curtail abuse by member states 
who threaten to leave so that favourable decisions be taken. 
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A common critique in the literature is that the procedure of Article 50 TEU is formulated in an 
incomplete, ambiguous and unclear manner thus causes substantial legal uncertainty.104 Thus 
this research seeks to gain an understanding on the content and interpretation of Article 50 so 
as to gain clarity as to the way in which article 50 would be implemented. As with any piece 
of legislation, Article 50 has areas of ambiguity which may prove problematic for the 
interpretation and the implementation of the exit clause. This research will look at some of the 
problematic areas. 
2.3.7 Concerns of Uncertainty in Article 50  
The exit clause seemingly was conceived with a view of providing for the withdrawal of one 
or two member states at a time rather than a group of members leaving at the same time. The 
European Council represents the EU in withdrawal negotiations in the same way it represents 
the EU in accession treaties. In the case of mass withdrawal and a more substantial number of 
member states were to withdraw, this role of the Council would not work for the purely 
practical and conceptual reason of the limited legitimacy of the Council representing a 
‘depleted’ EU.105 Article 50’s failure to cater for a mass exit raises concerns because due to the 
increasing dissatisfaction with the EU a group of member states may opt to leave at the same 
time.106 In this case the EU must have mechanisms to provide for such circumstance. A mass 
withdrawal, though highly unlikely, should have been provided for by the drafters of the Lisbon 
Treaty. 
There is a great debate as to whether the formal Notice of withdrawal of Article 50, once 
communicated to the European Council can be revocable. The UK seems to largely interpret 
Article 50 with the possibility of a revocation of the withdrawal Notice before the withdrawal 
agreement has been reached.107 The House of Lords EU Select Committee in its 11th Report108 
                                                          
104Hillion C Handbook of European Union Law (2015) 135. 
See also Arnull A and Chalmers D ‘Accession and Withdrawal in the Law of the European 
Union’ (2015) 126 The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law 149. 
  See also Hillion C ‘Accession and Withdrawal in the Law of the European Union’ in 
Handbook of European Union Law (2015) 124-152. 
105 Hillion C Handbook of European Union Law (2015) 135. 
106 Rickford J & Ayling R ‘Brexit Referendum and Article 50 of the Treaty on European 
Union A Legal Trap: the need for Legislation’ available at 
https://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/news/rickfordayling.pdf accessed on (27/03/2017). 
107 Rickford J & Ayling R ‘Brexit Referendum and Article 50 of the Treaty on European 
Union A Legal Trap: the need for Legislation’ available at 
https://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/news/rickfordayling.pdf accessed on (27/03/2017). 
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concludes that ‘there is nothing in Article 50 formally preventing a member state from 
reversing its decision to withdraw during the withdrawal negotiations. The political 
consequences of such a change of mind would, nevertheless be substantial.’ The Committee 
based its conclusions on the evidence of two witnesses: Edwards109 and Wyatt. 110 Edwards 
continued to say that a member state cannot be forced to go through with a withdrawal if it 
does not want to. However, Edwards does not substantiate nor justify his opinion.111 
Wyrozumska says that despite the fact the Article 50 TEU is silent on whether it is possible to 
withdraw the notification of withdrawal within a two-year period there would be no problem 
if all the member states consented. Wyrozumska goes on to say that it seems that Article 50 
TEU seems to indicate that such a withdrawal does not require the consent of the other member 
states, especially since there are no new arrangements necessary. This is because at this point 
there will be no fundamental changes made. For example, representatives of that member State 
will still be seating in all the institutions of the EU and be functioning as normal, except for the 
Council’s and the European Council’s where the exiting member state’s representatives cannot 
participate in the discussions and decisions surrounding the withdrawal.112 
Wyatt, however, argues that it imperative that comfort should not be drawn from the silence of 
the article on the question of whether reversal of Notification is permissible to a withdrawing 
member state. The fact that Article 50 does not expressly prohibit reversal does not necessarily 
mean that it is possible. Rather the silence is problematic as it does not address the possibility 
of a revocation at all therefore creating legal uncertainty and ambiguity on the matter. It is 
conversely dangerous to conclude that due to the lack of an express clause on the issue of 
revocation of a Notice then there is an implication of allowing it.113 There however is a 
concession that once the withdrawal agreement has been made then the Notice of Intention to 
leave the EU is no longer revocable. 
                                                          
109 A former judge of the European Court of Justice. 
110 Emeritus professor of law, Oxford University. 
111 Rickford J & Ayling R ‘Brexit Referendum and Article 50 of the Treaty on European 
Union A Legal Trap: the need for Legislation’ available at 
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112 Wyrozumska A The European Union After Lisbon: Constitutional Basis, Economic Order 
and External Action Withdrawal from the Union Anna (2012) 358-361. 
113 House of Lords European Union Committee Report 2015 - The Process of withdrawing 
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2.4 Possible routes for exit prior to Article 50 
Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty brought about an express exit clause from the EU. However, 
there are scholar arguments as to whether the absence of an express clause prior to the Lisbon 
treaty meant a complete inability to leave the EU. The question of the right to withdrawal was 
highly controversial. There are many arguments as to whether an exit was possible through 
instruments already provided by the International community or not. While some scholars 
believed that an exit was possible prior to the express exit clause provided by Article 50 some 
believed that an exit was not provided for and was therefore not possible.114 
2.4.1 Arguments for the possibility of an exit without an express clause 
Some authors have argued for the application of customary international law (clausula rebus 
sic stantibus, also established in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties 
(VCLT) providing for unilateral withdrawal from international treaties) within the EU 
framework.115 Article 62 of the VCLT116 provides for instances where there is a fundamental 
change which could not have been anticipated at the time of the signing of the treaty, where a 
member state may use Article 62 as a tool for withdrawal from a Treaty. Therefore making an 
exit from the EU possible prior Article 50. 
According to Lazowski, leaving the Union has always been possible, both legally and 
practically, despite the silence of the pre-Lisbon treaties on the matter. According to this view 
any of its contracting parties can leave the EU117 on the basis of the application of public 
international law, such as the VCLT, or customary international norms for those states that 
have not ratified the Convention.118 The absence of such a withdrawal clause in the statute of 
                                                          
114 Eva-Maria Poptcheva ‘Article 50 TEU: Withdrawal of a Member State from the EU’ 
(2016) European Parliamentary Research Service: Briefing available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/577971/EPRS_BRI(2016)577971
_EN.pdf  (accessed on 07 September 2016). 
115 Eva-Maria Poptcheva ‘Article 50 TEU: Withdrawal of a Member State from the EU’ 
(2016) European Parliamentary Research Service: Briefing available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/577971/EPRS_BRI(2016)577971
_EN.pdf  (accessed on 07 September 2016). 
116 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 62 UN Doc. A/Conf.39/27 / 1155 
UNTS 331 / 8 ILM 679 (1969) / 63 AJIL 875 (1969). 
117 Lazowski A ‘Withdrawal from the European Union and Alternatives to Membership’ 
(2012) 37 European Law Review 530. 
118 Rieder C M ‘The Withdrawal Clause of the Lisbon Treaty in the Light of EU Citizenship 
(Between Disintegration and Integration)’ (2013) 37 Fordham International Law Journal 1 
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an international organisation does not in itself prevent withdrawal by its participating states.119 
This is precisely because the EU treaties lack specific provisions to that effect in terms of lex 
specialis derogate legi generali120 rule which states that in the case of two or more laws dealing 
with the same subject matter, priority is given to the more specific provision. From this 
perspective, a member state could always invoke, for example, a ‘fundamental change of 
circumstances’, that is, the rebus sic stantibus121 clause in terms of Article  62 of the VCLT122 
to terminate its participation in the treaties, under the strict conditions of Articles 54,123 56124  
and Article 42125 of the VCLT126 In terms of the rebus sic stantibus principle a treaty is subject 
to an implied condition that if circumstances become substantially different from those 
obtained when it was concluded, then the aggrieved party to the treaty is entitled to be released 
from it. According to this school of thought the UK may use this rule as a point of departure. 
Booth & Howarth argue that a member state could unilaterally withdraw since sovereign states 
are in any case free to exercise their sovereign right to withdraw from the EU.127 According to 
this view in the case of the UK there are no practical impediments preventing the UK from 
exiting the EU. Under the British law, the sovereignty of the parliament means that the 
government does need the approval of the people to exit the EU.128 The only condition that the 
                                                          
119 Lazowski A ‘How to withdraw from the European Union? Confronting hard reality’ 
(2013) CEPS Commentary, available at  
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(accessed on 08/09/2016). 
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TEU’ (2016) 8 European Policy Analysis Journal 7-8. 
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Copy.pdf (accessed on 30/05/2017). 
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UK has to meet is to fulfil its domestic requirements according to Article 50 (1) as previously 
mentioned.129 While Poptcheva denied the possibility of a member state withdrawing 
unilaterally, he pointed to the role of the EU member states as 'masters of the Treaties', who 
could, in agreement, decide that a member state can terminate its membership which could in 
another sense support the ability to leave the EU.130  
2.4.2 Arguments against the possibility of an exit without an express clause 
Contrary to the belief that an exit from the EU was possible prior Article 50 it has been argued 
by some that it was not possible.131 The application of international law to fill in alleged gaps 
in the EU Treaties is often viewed as flawed, due to the specific character of the EU as a 
supranational organisation. This is because international law in certain instances does not 
interpret the law in line with the objectives and the purpose of the EU.  International law, which 
is by its nature general law in this particular instance, cannot replace the specific law of the 
EU. While the EU draws from international law for its own creation and a variety of rules, it 
was established as an autonomous legal order with its own separate rules.132 This would 
therefore bring possibilities of errors in interpretation or application as international law and 
EU law are two separate pieces of law. 
Furthermore, Maastricht Treaty brought about the permanent nature of the EU, as now reflected 
in Articles 53 of the TEU and 356 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). Article 53 of the TEU and Article 356 of the TFEU were understood by some legal 
scholars as excluding the possibility of unilateral withdrawal from the Treaties.133 Due to the 
prohibition of unilateral withdrawal, the member states could not simply leave the EU on a 
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whim but rather a protocol for leaving was put in place and it had to be due to material changes 
to the original agreement. According to this school of thought, the argument is rather the Lisbon 
Treaty was a compromise necessary in order to reach agreement on the Constitutional Treaty, 
clear from the comments attached to the draft provision (Article I-59) saying that it was a 
'political signal to anyone inclined to argue that the Union is a rigid entity which is impossible 
to leave'.134 This follows the failure of the EU to approve a constitution after a negative outcome 
on the Constitution Treaty in May and June 2005.135 
Friel is of the view that, leaving the EU was inconceivable prior to the inclusion of Article 50 
TEU.136 This is based on the idea that the EU was concluded for an unlimited duration, creating 
a Community of unlimited duration, aimed at ‘an ever closer union’, thus precluded member 
states’ unilateral withdrawal, which also included withdrawal by means of international law.137 
Notably, it has been noted that the strict conditions for termination based on a change of 
circumstances are unattainable for member states considering the ‘ever closer union’ purpose 
of the treaties to which all had to subscribe, and the fact that any significant modifications, for 
example, to the treaties, requires unanimous approval.138 The inclusion of an exit clause was 
thus regarded as contravening the commitment to an ever closer union that States take on when 
they become members139 and the underlying general principles of loyalty and solidarity to 
which they are thereby committed.140 The withdrawal clause of Article 50 TEU is now the de 
facto and de jure process141 for any member State wishing to exit the new EU supranational 
organisation. Thus a withdrawal prior Article 50 was not possible. 
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2.4.3 Viability of Article 10 of Protocol 36 as a tool for exit  
Article 10 of Protocol 36 has been put forward as another possible way to leave the EU prior 
Article 50 thus this discussion shall delve in the possibility of Article 10 of Protocol 36 as a 
way out of the EU. Article 10 of Protocol 36 to the EU Treaties is a legislative addition which 
enabled members of the EU to decide by the 31st of May 2014, whether or not they should 
continue to be bound by the approximately 130 police and criminal justice measures which 
were adopted before the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force.142 Members have the right to opt 
out or continue to be bound which means that those measures would all become subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Commission’s 
enforcement powers.143 
 
Article 10 of Protocol 36144 grants to the UK the right, five years after the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty the option to opt out of the police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters. This is an avenue that the UK could have taken in its bid to exit the EU. Article 10(4) 
of Protocol 36 provides that the relevant acts 'shall cease to apply' to UK. The language used 
in Article 50 TEU and Protocol 36 is strikingly similar. This therefore shows that while the UK 
has the option of making use of Article 50 it could have also possibly used Article 10 of 
protocol 36 to exit the EU. However, a close look at Protocol 36 would show that Protocol 36 
unlike Article 50 does not provide for a complete exit but rather an option to opt out of the 
specific things mentioned in Protocol 36. With the use of Article 10 of protocol 36 the UK 
would submit a notification to the Council and certain parts of EU law cease to apply to it. 145  
 
The phrasing of the Protocol suggests that if the opt out clause is not used before May 2014 
then a member state would have waived their right to opt out. Whereas other measures and 
protocols are of an ongoing nature, Protocol 36 opt-out was crafted as a ‘one off’, ‘use it or 
                                                          
142Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command 
of Her Majesty (2013) ‘Decision pursuant to Article 10 of Protocol 36 to The Treaty on the 
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144The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2007,  Protocol (No 36) on 
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lose it’ opportunity.146 It should however, be emphasised that the bloc opt-out would not apply 
to all pre-Lisbon ‘Justice and Home Affairs’ measures, but only to pre-Lisbon policing and 
criminal law measures.147 Article 50 of the TEU, however, is a total exit from the group 
completely not certain measures. Evidently, the bloc opt-out could only apply to measures 
adopted prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, not measures adopted after its 
entry into force unlike Article 50 which would sweep away all agreements made with the EU. 
 
From the above discussion one can note that the UK could no longer use Protocol 36 as a way 
to exit the EU considering that the application to opt out was not made before the end of May 
2014. In the above discussion one can note that by not opting out before the end of May 2014 
the UK may be said to have tacitly agreed to be bound by the EU law and waived its right to 
opt out using Protocol 36 thus cannot use Protocol 36 as its way out of the EU. The matter of 
an exit prior Article 50 is still in scholarly discussion and no absolute conclusion has been 
deduced.  One however tends to lean on the possibility of an exit even in the absence of an 
express clause. The importance of state sovereignty in the light of a supranational organisation 
is very important. It is objectionable that an exit was tacitly incorporated in the EU law. It 
seems unlikely that there would be no route of an exit whatsoever in such a big organisation 
such as the EU either through International customary law, public international law or the 
VCLT. Due to this uncertainty and an evident need for an exit clause the EU decided to design 
and incorporate an express legislation that provided a way out of the EU which later manifested 
in the form of Article 50.  
2.5 Conclusion 
 
The EU was as a culmination of many agreements that were signed over a period of time. What 
started out as a group of six members grew and became what we call now call the EU. An exit 
from this prestigious Union was never the idea behind the EU; instead the aim was an even 
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greater union. While an exit was never the aim it was also important that an exit clause be 
included in the Treaty of Lisbon in the form of Article 50. Article 50 is a seemingly short piece 
of legislation however, it is packed with many formalities and procedures as explained above. 
At the same time Article 50 is also subject to many areas of uncertainty which can be attributed 
to the fact that it has not been used before and the way it has been formulated by the legislators. 
As above mentioned, there are various scholarly arguments as to whether an exit was possible 
prior the express clause in the form of Article 50. This argument seems to point that to a greater 
extent there was a possibility of an exit rather than a complete prohibition. In this chapter the 
interpretation and the concerns raised by seemingly grey areas in Article 50 were also 
discussed. The uncertainty can also be accounted to the unprecedented and rather novel use of 
the Article. 
The next chapter will focus on the route most likely to be taken by the UK which is Article 50. 
It will look into the practical steps that the UK needs to take in going for the Brexit. 
Furthermore, the chapter will look at the constitutional requirements that the UK needs to meet 
before they can invoke the exit procedure. This is so that the discussion may bring light to the 
practical steps that are required as a member contemplates an exit from the EU. 
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Chapter 3: Interpretation and 
Implementation of Article 50 by the UK 
  
3.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter discussed in detail the historical dynamic of the formation of the 
European Union (EU). The chapter discussed the Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on 
the European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community (Lisbon Treaty) 
(2007/C 306/01), the origin of Article 50, theoretical overview of Article 50 and its problematic 
areas in terms of interpretation. The chapter discussed the possibility of an exit prior to Article 
50 and the various scholarly views on the right of withdrawal at that time. While there were 
many arguments for and against the possibility of an exit before Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty 
it seems evident that there was no clear-cut answer as to whether there was a possibility or not. 
However, the advent of Article 50 answers the answer to this debate.   
This chapter intends to consider practical implications of the Brexit and the route taken by the 
UK in going for the exit. It also looks at the domestic environment needed for the triggering of 
the exit procedure. Furthermore, the chapter will discuss the position of the June Referendum 
and the position of the UK Parliament in the decision-making process of the exit. The chapter 
also intends to look at the UK- Scotland conflict of interest and its implications. 
3.2 The road to Brexit 
 
The UK is on its way out of the EU which has been termed the Brexit, an abbreviation for the 
British exit148 as per the majority vote on 23 June 2016 Referendum.149 A majority of the British 
electorate voted to leave but this position has not been the same for the ordinary citizen. It 
seems that while the majority of the British people voted out of the EU most people do not 
understand how the EU works and it’s Constitution.150 Thereby bringing questions as to 
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whether the ordinary citizen made a well-informed decision with regard to Brexit. What makes 
the Brexit complicated is that it is notably propelled by political and economic developments 
within and outside of the UK.151 Despite these questions the new UK Prime Minister, Theresa 
May, has confirmed that Brexit will go ahead.152 It is far from clear at the time of writing what 
will happen next or how the UK proposes to proceed to leave the EU, and what agreement can 
be reached with the EU153 as this will only be packaged in the withdrawal agreement. 
 
The UK has already put forward their official Notice of Intention to leave the EU using the 
Article 50 procedure.154 However, before this process was initiated the UK held a referendum 
requesting its citizens to decide whether or not they wanted to stay in the EU. It now, therefore, 
becomes important to discuss the legality of the referendum and its position in UK law in the 
light of Article 50 (1) and whether the referendum constitutes a constitutional requirement the 
UK has to fulfil before it can proceed with the exit. This will now be discussed below.  
3.3 The Referendum  
 
David Cameron committed the Conservative Party to hold an in or out referendum after an 
attempted renegotiation of Britain's membership of the EU.  On 10 November 2015, David 
Cameron sent a letter to the EU Council President, Donald Tusk pointing out issues that he felt 
needed to be resolved before the UK could consider a future relationship with the EU.155 These 
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discussions did not yield favourable results for the UK thus the referendum deciding on the 
future EU-UK relationship was held. Euro-scepticism views are not a novel idea. Since the 
1970s and 1980s, the British Labour and Greek Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) 
parties have campaigned for withdrawal from what was then the European Economic 
Community (EEC).156 The referendum is characteristic of the euro-sceptical parties across the 
UK coming to the limelight once again.157   
Article 50 states that member states may exit the EU using their own constitutional 
requirements.158 These constitutional requirements can therefore not be found in the EU 
legislation but rather in the legislation of the UK. However, UK Constitutional law is 
ambiguous on the issue of leaving the EU. This is compounded by the fact that the UK has no 
codified constitution better yet legislation that specifically deals with the matter.159 The British 
system of governance is characterised by its lack of an entrenched Constitution, unlike most 
modern states. The absence of a constitution does not, however, mean that the country does not 
have a body of constitutional law and is based entirely on custom and precedent.160 In the 
absence of a written constitution, the government has put in place various statutes speaking 
into the composition of powers of particular institutions. There are statutory provisions for 
various institutions of government as they are provided for individually. Unlike most modern 
states Britain, is a combination of a monarchical system and a democratic government.161 
Therefore one finds that the powers of the monarchy are limited by the Bill of Rights of 1689 
and the Act of Settlement of 1701. The powers of the House of Lords are provided by the 
Parliaments Acts of 1911 and 1949 and the electoral system is regulated by the Representation 
of the People Acts of 1948 and 1949. The lack of a constitution means that there is no 
documentary and precise statement between the pillars of government.162 This, in turn, breeds 
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uncertainty between writers and politicians as they often produce significantly different 
interpretations and the separation of powers between these institutions becomes a grey area in 
the law.  
The question whether the referendum is legally binding is therefore dependent on the 
legislation enabling the referendum.  The June referendum held no requirement for the EU 
Referendum Act result to be implemented by the UK Government.163 This scenario is not new 
in the British legal system. This is because referendums in the UK framework are generally not 
held to be significant.164 The position of a referendum in the UK legal system is to a certain 
extent ambiguous especially with regards to its relationship with parliamentary sovereignty.165 
The referendum has therefore been labelled as being an advisory rather than a mandatory 
referendum, enabling the electorate to express its opinion before any legislation might be 
introduced.166 The EU Referendum was put in place to reflect what the public wanted and as 
an expression of popular sovereignty. Yet, UK law generally does not acknowledge a principle 
of popular sovereignty rather parliamentary sovereignty vested in the Crown. UK law is rather 
based on representative democracy rather than direct democracy unlike many modern 
governments today.167  
In principle, both the government and Parliament could choose to ignore the result of the 
referendum and it would be perfectly legal.168 They could choose never to trigger Article 50 
TEU nor repeal the European Communities Act1972 (ECA).169 This goes to show that the 
‘decision’ made by the UK people through voting in the referendum was not in itself a 
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‘decision’ nor is it the ‘trigger’ for purposes of Article 50.170 A referendum alone is not enough 
to trigger Article 50 instead a more official decision is required.171  
The UK referendum spells a great change in the political and economic climate of the UK yet 
one can note that there is a lot of uncertainty. It is important to note that the UK law does not 
spell out critical issues such as to who will trigger Article 50 and whether an Act of Parliament 
is necessary to trigger Article 50, whether another referendum should be held to approve any 
Withdrawal Agreement.172 This brings questions as to whose responsibility it would be to 
trigger Article 50 and the conditions that need to present. This paper will discuss this question 
more in this chapter.  
The above discussion shows that the referendum is not legally binding but rather is advisory. 
It shows that legally the government is not compelled to implement the result of the 
referendum. The UK is governed based on parliamentary sovereignty and not popular 
sovereignty. The UK system is representative therefore the Parliament stands in the shoes of 
the people rather than a direct vote which the referendum would amount to. 
 The research will now continue to discuss the whether the Parliament needs to consent to the 
triggering of the exit procedure and to what extent or if a Royal prerogative will suffice. This 
is so that one may get a mind map of how the exit will be implemented internally thereby 
fulfilling the requirement of Article 50(1).    
3.4 Constitutional Requirements for the Brexit  
Article 50 provides that a member state has to exit the EU using its own constitutional 
requirements. Consequently, the UK has to exit on the basis of its constitutional requirements. 
The UK as mentioned in section 3.3 of this chapter has no constitution but has a constitutional 
body of law that it adheres to. It is however sometimes difficult to decipher where the arms of 
government start and end due to the lack of a constitution. 
                                                          
170 Douglas-Scott S ‘Brexit, the referendum and the UK Parliament: some questions about 
sovereignty' available at https://constitution-unit.com/2016/06/29/brexit-the-referendum-and-
the-uk-parliament-some-questions-about-sovereignty/ (accessed on 17/03/2017). 
171 Elliot N ‘Brexit: Legally and constitutionally, what now?’ 24 June 2016 Public Law for 
Everyone available at https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2016/06/24/brexit-legally-and-
constitutionally-what-now/ (accessed on 22/03/2017). 
172 Douglas-Scott S ‘Brexit, Article 50 and the Contested British Constitution’ available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2230.12228/full (accessed on 14/ 03/17). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
35 
 
The principal of separation of powers which is characteristic of many democratic states today 
is also found in the UK government. However, in the UK it is more fluid than the strict 
interpretation of the separation of powers.173 Another dominant feature of the UK system is 
that the legislative supremacy of Parliament seems to be fluid and flexible. The Parliament has 
been known to sometimes delegate its powers of legislation to the executive branch.174 This 
delegation of the Parliament’s sovereignty has been attributed to the general dominance of the 
House of Commons by the executive. In principle, the parliament remains sovereign but in 
practice, the executive commands both the principle and the detail of the statute.175 In the same 
breath Parliament has also been known to usurp the role of the Judiciary especially in criminal 
cases where they pass Act of Attainder thus showing that there is not a clear separation of 
powers.176 This, therefore, brings uncertainty as to which branch of government has to right to 
trigger Article 50 better yet negotiate the terms of withdrawal.  
The royal prerogative speaks to the rights of the Crown which are founded in the primitive 
common-law privileges of the monarch rather and not a legal authority by Parliament. The 
royal prerogative exists by tradition and custom, not by any officially written-down code or 
constitution.177 It is therefore difficult to assess the full measure of prerogative powers. It is 
undisputed that a consequence of the Revolution was the curtailing of prerogative powers 
through the establishment of the parliamentary control of all of the Crown's prerogatives 
through parliamentary sovereignty. Theresa May, however, asserted that the prerogative was 
still the appropriate way to trigger Article 50 on the basis that the prerogative traditionally 
includes powers relating to foreign affairs, such as treaty negotiation.178 However, prerogative 
power as a means for triggering Article 50 has been found problematic. This is based on the 
fact that while the consent of Parliament was required for ‘every word of the law’, the same is 
not required in the creation of a Treaty. Prerogative power has thus been labelled to be totally 
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unacceptable by some scholars.179 This is because the Crown can, therefore, make Treaties 
without the knowledge or the consent of the Parliament which is supposed to be the law-making 
body of the land. This therefore leads to ambiguity as to which branch has the power to trigger 
Article 50. 
In the UK system Parliament is sovereign. What this means is that there is no constitutional 
limitation to Parliamentary authority.  Yet Parliamentary sovereignty finds itself in contrast to 
Popular Sovereignty which the referendum propagated. This leads one to believe that it is then 
the Parliament that has to lead in this novel and brave journey towards the Brexit and possibly 
pull the trigger. The ECA 1972 also states that if the UK no longer wishes to be a part of an 
international Treaty the Parliament has to repeal this statute and Institute replacing 
legislation.180 
3.4.1 The Position of the Parliament in the triggering of the exit procedure 
Following the 2016 Referendum where the majority voted to leave the EU Gina Miller brought 
a claim to the court in the Miller case.181 The question brought before the court was whether 
parliamentary approval was needed before the notification could lawfully be given of the UK's 
intention to leave. The Government at this point was arguing that the use of prerogative powers 
to enact the referendum result were constitutionally proper and consistent with domestic law. 
Ms Miller was not convinced that this position was correct and was of the assertion that 
prerogative powers could not be used to set aside rights previously established by Parliament. 
The court delivered a unanimous judgement against the government's assertion that the Crown's 
prerogative allowed giving Article 50 notice, and the Court would later decide on the form of 
declaration it would make. The Court described the passing of the ECA 1972 as the major step 
of ‘switching on the direct effect of EU law in the national legal systems’, the court found that 
the Crown cannot change domestic law without the approval of the Parliament. The Court also 
held that Parliament has the exclusive right to trigger notification under article 50 of the TEU. 
This assertion was based on the fact that triggering Article 50 results in the nullification of Acts 
created by Parliament. Parliamentary Sovereignty principles require that only Parliament can 
create, dismantle internal legislation and create replacing legislation. This position is also 
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expressed in the Case of Proclamations (1608)182, the Bill of Rights 1688 section 1183, and 
continually confirmed since in cases including Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Lord Advocate184, and R 
(Jackson) v Attorney General185. The Crown therefore has no power to alter domestic law 
through prerogative power. This ruling made it clear that Theresa May may not trigger Article 
50 through the use of prerogative powers rather the Parliament had to provide consent and 
enabling legislation. 
To further substantiate the Miller case, the question as to who can trigger Article 50 is an 
important one and cannot be discussed without considering the powers of the Parliament as it 
is the law-making body in the UK. Triggering Article 50 requires that replacing legislation be 
created and thus the powers of the Parliament must be accessed in this regard. It is important 
to note that the UK provided for its accession to the EEC to be ratified by means of the ECA 
1972. Under British law, a statute may only be repealed by another statute, and not through the 
use of prerogative power. Triggering Article 50 has the ripple effect of nullifying the effect of 
the ECA in UK law. On the basis of the above argument a parliamentary repeal is the most 
viable option for an exit. 
The constitutional requirements for a decision by the UK to leave the EU include the enactment 
of primary legislation consenting to give legal effect to the terms of a withdrawal or authorising 
the UK’s withdrawal from the EU in the absence of any such agreement.186 Only Parliament 
has the constitutional authority to authorise, and give legal effect to, the changes in domestic 
law and existing legal rights that will follow from that decision. This therefore points to the 
fact that UK domestic constitutional law does not allow Theresa May to start the Brexit process 
in this case, through the use of the notice without the prior blessing of Parliament.187 This 
position is further substantiated by the Miller case in the Constitutional court which is discussed 
below. 
                                                          
182 Case of Proclamations [1610] EWHC KB J22. 
183 Bill of Rights (Act) 1689 (England) 1688 c.2 (1 Will and Mar Sess 2). 
184 Burmah Oil Company Ltd v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75. 
185 R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56. 
186 Jagran J Current Affairs December 2016 eBook  (2016)  76.  
187 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
38 
 
3.4.2 The way Forward now 
In October 2016, Theresa May announced the March 2017 deadline for triggering Article 50 
which was finally implemented on 29 March 2017.188 In an interview, she promised a Great 
Repeal Bill. The Bill will however only become effective when the UK has concluded the 
Withdrawal agreement with the EU.189 The Great Repeal Bill proposes to repeal the European 
Communities Act (ECA) of 1972190 and to ensure that EU law that has not already been ratified 
into national law remains in force from the date of withdrawal. It is also aimed at ousting the 
effect and priority given to EU law within the UK domestic legal system.191 The idea behind 
repealing the ECA is to free the UK from the supremacy of the EU but to lean rather on national 
sovereignty. 
The triggering of Article 50 demands that safeguard for further parliamentary control in the 
UK's withdrawal negotiations and future framework with the EU relations be put in place. As 
it stands these discussions are likely to be conducted according to the usual practice under the 
prerogative.192 This is hardly a transparent process as the discussions are mainly concluded 
behind closed doors by politicians.193 This is due to the fact that Parliament traditionally does 
not major in foreign and trade negotiations. Due to the major discussions being conducted 
                                                          
188 Hughes L ‘Theresa May triggers Article 50 with warning over security as EU leaders rule 
out key Brexit demand’ The Telegraph 30 March 2017 available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/29/article-50-triggered-brexit-eu-theresa-may-
watch-live/ (accessed on 31/03/2017). 
189 Hughes L ‘Theresa May triggers Article 50 with warning over security as EU leaders rule 
out key Brexit demand’ The Telegraph 30 March 2017 available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/29/article-50-triggered-brexit-eu-theresa-may-
watch-live/ (accessed on 31/03/2017). 
190 European Communities Act 1972 (1972), Chapter 68. 
191 Carrozzo B & Costo Lucco N ‘Brexit means Brexit, but what does the second Brexit 
mean? Dirritti Comparati Working Papers available at 
http://diritto.typepad.com/files/DirittiComparati_WorkingPapers4-2016.pdf (accessed on 
29/03/2017). 
192 History of Scotland available at 
http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?ParagraphID=oaq#ixzz4bx1WC
rvM (accessed on 30/03/2017). 
193 History of Scotland available at 
http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?ParagraphID=oaq#ixzz4bx1WC
rvM (accessed on 30/03/2017). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
39 
 
behind closed doors it is exceptionally hard for Parliament to have meaningful contribution on 
these Treaty issues due to its inability to access information in advance of negotiations.194 
The chapter will now discuss the UK-Scotland dilemma. This is because while the UK voted 
to leave the EU, Scotland and Ireland voted to stay in the EU. This raises the question of 
whether the UK as a whole will exit the EU or Scotland and Ireland will stay. This will 
undoubtedly have an impact on the withdrawal agreement and the future relationship between 
Scotland and the EU, considering that Scotland and Ireland are part of the UK. Furthermore, 
neither UK law nor Article 50 guarantees Scotland and Ireland specific roles in the negotiation 
process or in the withdrawal agreement.195 At best Scotland and Ireland can only contribute to 
the final outcome. However, the extent of the contribution and its weight is dependent on 
agreement and goodwill between Westminster (Parliament of the UK) and the respective 
parliaments of Scotland and Ireland.196 Even in this situation, the Westminster holds the 
balance of power and Scotland and Ireland does not have an equal footing with the 
Westminster.197  It is thus important to clarify the positions of the two constituents of the UK 
so as to ensure a clear strategy for the UK withdrawal and for clarity purposes. 
3.5 The UK- Scotland Dilemma 
 
When referring to the Brexit it is easy to imply that the vote to leave represents all of the UK 
yet the UK is made of a number of states namely Wales, Northern Ireland, England and 
Scotland as mentioned in chapter 1. The referendum has cast a spotlight on the fact that  the 
UK is indeed a divided nation. England and Wales voted to leave, while Scotland and Northern 
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Ireland voted to remain.198 A closer analysis of the poll results showed the difference of 
opinions between people residing in urban and rural areas, and the youths and the elderly.199 
Consequently, the referendum result may not provide a true reflection of the UK as a whole. 
Thus we see an apparent conflict of interest between the Westminster and Scotland and Ireland 
who do not wish to risk their position in the EU.200 
 
Leaving the EU means that the UK as a whole will lose the benefits that are attached to EU 
membership and the supremacy of EU law will seize to apply in the UK domestic policy. The 
UK will also not be forced to follow the precedent of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) nor 
will it have jurisdiction over UK.201 While this may mean greater freedom of trade for the UK 
it also means that the UK will lose the preferential treatment it enjoyed in terms of EU 
membership. The UK stands to lose the benefit of the single market.202 This also applies to 
Scotland and Ireland as they are part of the UK. 
For the purposes of this mini research the focus will only be on Scotland. This is because while 
Ireland voted to leave they are ready to concede,203 however, Scotland has been vocal about 
their discomfort in leaving the EU and is also currently contemplating a break away from the 
EU on the basis of the Brexit204 thus this paper will focus on Scotland rather than Ireland. 
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Scotland has consistently voiced its desire to remain in the EU.205 This paper will now discuss 
the possible ways in which Scotland may try and counter the effects of the Brexit and whether 
they may still hold on to EU membership in the light of Brexit. 
3.5.1 Aftermath of the UK referendum on the UK-Scotland relationship  
 
The UK referendum came only two years after Scotland has held its own Scotland 
independence referendum and the majority voted to stay in the UK. The independence 
campaign is mainly propagated by the Scottish National Party (SNP).206 Despite the very recent 
independence referendum, the SNP has brought the issue of independence back to the 
discussion tables on the basis that the circumstance two years ago is not the same as they are 
now.207 Scotland is the biggest proponent of staying in the EU but may be forced to exit the 
EU against their will and interest. The Scots are currently the most pro-European in the whole 
UK considering the fact that not one of the 32 Scottish electoral regions voted to leave.208 Thus 
there has been an outcry for independence from the UK so that Scotland may safeguard their 
position in the EU.209 Yet at the same time the prospect of a border between England and 
Scotland, and different trading regimes worry the voters rather than shift them towards 
independence.210 Thus one finds that while Scotland is generally pro EU membership they are 
divided when it comes to the issue of independence from the UK. 
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Although Scotland voted to remain in the EU, the Scotland vote did not constitute a majority 
thus the Scottish result may be ignored. The SNP consequently tabled an amendment to the EU 
Referendum Bill, requiring that for the UK to leave the EU, each of the four constituent nations 
England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland would have to vote to do so in their own 
capacities and not jointly. This proposal by the Scottish Prime Minister Nicole Sturgeon was 
aimed at ensuring that none of the UK nations would be removed from the EU against their 
will. Sturgeon also points out that withdrawing Scotland against its will would be 
‘democratically indefensible’.211 
 
A forced move out of the EU for Scotland has a ripple effect not only in the democratic structure 
of the nation. The effect of the move will be felt in about five areas in the Scottish legal system. 
Firstly, the democratic interests of Scotland as a nation seem to be ignored. Secondly, the 
economic interests such as safeguarding free movement of goods, services, and labour, access 
to a single market, the funding that farmers and universities depend on will be lost once 
Scotland leaves the EU together with the UK.212 Thirdly Scotland has social protection 
interests, for example, ensuring the continued protection of workers' and wider human rights 
that may be lost, fourthly tackling crime and terrorism and finally climate change and influence 
run the risk of being ignored.213 It is apparent that even though the UK may not be a part of the 
EU some of its law will still affect the UK; Scotland wants to have an influence on the rules 
that will eventually affect it.214   
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Issues of Foreign affairs including EU membership are dealt with in terms of matter under 
Schedule 5 of the Scotland Act of 1998.215 Neither Article 50 nor UK law which deals with the 
Devolution Acts guarantees Scotland a specific role in the withdrawal. This seems to allow the 
Prime Minister to renegotiate Britain's EU membership with European Council, without having 
to secure the agreement of the devolved nations. 216  Which can in effect mean that Scotland 
can be taken out of the EU without its consent217, a situation that is abnormal considering that 
Scotland is a nation and must be treated as such.218 This effectively means that Scotland will 
have no say in the exit better yet the withdrawal agreement which could be detrimental to their 
interests. 
 
Due to the UK lacking a constitution there is uncertainty as to whether the Scottish Parliament 
has a bearing in terms of triggering Article 50 and the withdrawal agreement and the post-
Brexit relationship. The question is whether Scotland can still influence the outcome of the 
Brexit through the ratification of the withdrawal agreement and how much weight their 
ratification has on the Brexit as a whole. There is a possibility that Scotland may still choose 
to thwart the authority of Westminster internally. It has for example been suggested that for the 
enactment by the UK Parliament of the legislative mechanism to give effect to the vote for 
Brexit it would require the consent of the Scottish Parliament under the so-called Sewel 
Convention, now enshrined in the Scotland Act Article 5.219 This is built on the fact that the 
withdrawal agreements have the potential to alter the legislative competence of the Scottish 
Parliament and the executive competence of Scottish Ministers. Therefore, in trying to ensure 
that their voice is being heard the Scottish Parliament may refuse to give legislative consent 
                                                          
215Scotland Act 1998 Chapter 46, Schedule 5 available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/46/pdfs/ukpga_19980046_en.pdf (accessed on 
28/05/2017). 
216 Czapiewski T ‘Scotland at the crossroads. From Brexit to Neverrendum’ University of 
Szczecin available at http://paperroom.ipsa.org/app/webroot/papers/paper_53795.pdf 
(accessed on 29/03/2017). 
217 Czapiewski T ‘Scotland at the crossroads. From Brexit to Neverrendum’ University of 
Szczecin available at http://paperroom.ipsa.org/app/webroot/papers/paper_53795.pdf 
(accessed on 29/03/2017). 
218 Riley-Smith B & Hughes L ‘MPs vote to renew Trident: Jeremy Corbyn suffers biggest 
rebellion of his leadership as Britain's nuclear deterrent backed by 472 to 117’ The Telegraph 
19 July 2016 available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/18/trident-vote-jeremy-
corbyn-facing-labour-mutiny-as-mps-set-to-ba/ (accessed on 29/03/2017). 
219 Scotland Act 1998 Chapter 46, Article 5 available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/46/pdfs/ukpga_19980046_en.pdf (accessed on 
28/05/2017). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
44 
 
thereby stalling the Brexit process.220 However, Scotland may not be able to stall or barricade 
the Brexit process forever when considering that the UK Parliament is sovereign as provided 
by the Scotland Act 7221 therefore the Parliament may continue with the Brexit without the vote 
from Scotland. It can be asserted that in practice there is a possibility that the Parliament may 
proceed without legislative consent either by not seeking it at all or by ignoring its refusal if 
sought.222 
 
Scotland has found itself between a rock and a hard place in this Brexit dilemma. This is 
compounded by the fact that under Brexit, there may well be a constitutional and legal ground 
on which the UK government can demand or force the Scottish parliament to repeal EU 
legislation. The Scottish government therefore faces major decisions as to whether, and on 
what basis, it would go along with Brexit processes.  
 
3.5.2 Options for Scotland 
Antunes proposes that Scotland has four options that they may take so as to safeguard their 
interest which is to leave the EU with the rest of the UK or to move rapidly to a second 
independence referendum with the aim of staying seamlessly in the EU. Antunes also proposes 
that Scotland should challenge, block and stall the Brexit process, creating a deep political and 
constitutional crisis. Finally, Antunes proposes that Scotland should leave the EU with the rest 
of the UK, and argues for Scotland to negotiate a closer, differentiated relationship with the 
EU than the rest of the UK may choose.223 It goes without saying that all the options provided 
are very difficult and are followed by serious legal and political consequences. 
 
                                                          
220 Czapiewski T ‘Scotland at the crossroads. From Brexit to Neverrendum’ University of 
Szczecin available at http://paperroom.ipsa.org/app/webroot/papers/paper_53795.pdf 
(accessed on 29/03/2017). 
221 Scotland Act 1998 Chapter 46, Article 5 available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/46/pdfs/ukpga_19980046_en.pdf (accessed on 
28/05/2017). 
222 Little A ‘What impact might Brexit have on Scotland's future?’ BBC News 20 March 
2017 available at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-39317865 
(accessed on 29/03/2017) 
223 Sandrina Antunes ‘UK, Scotland and the European dilemma: Brexit in a few words’ 
(2016) 164 Instituto Galego de Análise e Documentación Internacional 3-4. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
45 
 
The choice to which option will be used is likely to depend on the public and political reactions 
across Scotland to vote for Brexit and the Brexit vote in the rest of the UK and across the EU.224 
If Scotland chooses to apply as an independent state under Article 49 of the Treaty of Lisbon225 
and fulfilment of accession it seems that Scotland would have to start the accession procedure 
de novo which may take time considering the complexity of international treaties. While Article 
49 provides an outline of the basic assertion process and legal room for the assertion of Article 
49 it is hardly an easy process. In practice membership actually, happens on the political 
table.226 The use of these criteria does not mean that the assertion procedure is automatically 
fast-tracked on the basis of previous membership for the past 43 years under the UK. This is 
because without the consent of all Member States, accession or remain for Scotland in the 
European Union will not be possible, because such action requires changes at the level of the 
treaty.227 One of the strongest arguments of the fast-track is that Scottish citizens clearly will 
be forced to leave the EU against their will.228 This alludes to the fact that in practice there is 
no way for Scotland may seamlessly remain in the EU as suggested by Antunes. These negative 
signals are however not a deterrent form leaving the EU as verbalised by the leaders of the 
SNP.229  
 
It is argued by Edward and Schuibhne that an independent Scotland might also consider joining 
EFTA, even on an interim basis. Joining the Economic Free Trade Area (EFTA) would help 
Scotland in that it establishes a relationship with the EU on the basis of the EEA.230 Using that 
framework Scotland would have access to the internal market once it accepts the legal 
obligations that follow this relationship. Scotland could also retain full participation in other 
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EU aided programs including regulatory competence over considerably more policy areas such 
as agriculture and fisheries. And difficult questions such as the issue of currency could at least 
be postponed.231 
 
It is important to note that every option is not without consequence. Scotland is also in limbo 
as to the position it will take in future. 
3.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter provided a basic understanding of the route taken by the UK in their quest for an 
exit. The chapter brings to light the conditions required for triggering Article 50 and answers 
the question of who has the right to trigger Article 50 while giving context to internal 
constitutional requirements. It highlights that the lack of a codified constitution does not mean 
the lack of a constitutional body of law. However, it does mean there is no clear separation of 
the pillars of government. 
 
The chapter concludes that it was not permissible for the Prime Minister to invoke the royal 
prerogative so that she may invoke Article 50. Instead, the Parliament has to agree and create 
replacing legislation as the law making body of the UK. The question as to the influence of the 
Parliament with regards to the withdrawal agreement remains open as it is not clear how much 
influence they can exercise. It is also apparent that the triggering of Article 50 brings concern 
to Scotland, a constituent of the UK which does not intend to leave the EU. This has raised a 
lot of questions as to the options that Scotland has. It seems that despite the protest of Scotland 
the UK is still going forward with the Brexit. It still remains unclear what Scotland will do to 
remedy this conflict of interest. 
 
The next chapter will now look at the implications of the Brexit on the UK, the EU and 
particularly the trade implications of the Brexit on developing countries with reference to 
preferential trade agreements. 
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Chapter 4: The ripple effects of the 
Brexit on Developing countries in Africa 
4.1 Introduction 
The United Kingdom (UK) has triggered Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, therefore, putting 
forward its intention to formally leave the European Union (EU).232 It has been found that while 
the June 2016 Referendum was a critical point in the exit of the UK from the EU, the 
Referendum was not legally binding but rather advisory.233 The UK had to fulfil its 
constitutional requirements before it could trigger the exit procedure as mentioned in the 
previous chapter. It also became apparent that the Parliament has to create replacing legislation 
and therefore trigger the exit procedure as pointed out by the Miller case.234 It was also found 
that the withdrawal of the UK was not representative of the whole of the UK. The UK is 
constitutes of a number of constituencies including Scotland and Ireland who indicated their 
wish to stay in the EU through the Referendum but may be forced to go ahead with the Brexit 
regardless of  their desire to remain in the EU.235 The previous chapter highlighted the 
possibility that Scotland may opt to break away from the UK and the possible implications 
thereof. 
One of the major reasons for the Brexit was the need to attain state Sovereignty.236 The exit 
from the EU will bring a measure of Sovereignty. The UK for the first time in forty years will 
no longer be under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The UK no longer 
be expected implement EU law within their domestic system neither will EU law be supreme 
above the UK domestic policy.237 As part of the EU, the UK has had little control over its 
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trading arrangements with developing countries. Leaving the EU Customs Union means that 
the UK it will regain control of the tariffs, policies, and rules governing its own trade.238 
Thereby finally realising the UK’s desire to become a global leader in free trade. It is therefore 
imperative that one looks ahead to see what the post Brexit future holds. There are a myriad of 
implications not only for the UK but for the EU and the future relationship of the UK and 
developing counties regarding trade agreements.  
In the light of the above observation this chapter will look briefly at the possible implication 
of the Brexit for the UK, EU and third parties, specifically developing countries in Africa. The 
chapter will look at the changes ahead of both the UK and developing countries with regard to 
trade agreements. The chapter therefore starts with the current position of the UK as a member 
of the EU and its relationship with third parties in light of Preferential Trade Agreements 
(PTAs), after which the chapter will discuss the UK future foreign policy with third parties. 
The chapter with go on to discuss the effect of the Brexit on developing countries and the 
possible options for UK with regard to developing countries and its future foreign policy. 
Measures that may be also taken to counter the effects of the Brexit will end this discussion of 
the Brexit for this mini thesis. 
It is important to note that until the withdrawal agreement has been finalised it is not possible 
to provide a thorough or detailed synopsis of what the UK domestic policy will look like as 
well as its foreign policy and how it will impact third parties.  One can however predict some 
elements of the UK foreign policy and its implications.  
4.2 The UK as a member of the EU and its relationship with third parties 
 
The history of the UK foreign policy is inextricably joined to the hip with the EU foreign 
policy. As a signatory of the EU, UK adopted and nationalised the EU foreign policy for the 
past 40 years. One would therefore not do justice to discuss the UK foreign policy without 
mentioning the EU policy. 
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The EU is part of various multilateral agreements one of which is the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). The WTO was birthed from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
whose main intention was to create an economic foundation, based on the theory of 
comparative advantage and preferential trade.239 In 1995, the GATT was replaced by the WTO 
established by the Marrakesh Agreement.240 For the purposes of this research the discussion 
will look focus on EU membership to the WTO only. The EU joined the WTO in 1995 as the 
European Community which later became the EU after the Lisbon Treaty. As part of the WTO, 
the EU is bound by WTO principles. Two of the most important principles of the WTO are the 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle and the National Treatment (NT).241 MFN treatment 
principle provides that a member of the WTO may not enter into a preferential agreement with 
a specific country without providing the same preferential treatment for all members of the 
WTO.242 This means that a member of the WTO may not enter into a Preferential Trade 
Agreement (PTA) with another country which is exclusive of other members of the WTO. 
While NT provides a prohibition of discrimination between imported and domestically 
produced goods with respect to internal taxation or other government regulation.243 In short a 
member of the WTO cannot discriminate goods from another member state purely on the basis 
of their origin. The UK as a part of the EU is bound by these rules as well. 
On the face of it, the MFN treatment does not allow for WTO members to enter into preferential 
treatments.244 The EU was able to enter into preferential trade agreements with developing 
counties on the basis of what is called the Regional exception or the enabling clause.245 The 
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Regional Exception is provided in Article XXIV of the GATT246 which provides an exception 
for entry into preferential trade agreements exclusive of WTO member states. In terms of 
Article XXIV, WTO members with a common interest may conclude agreements themselves 
without extending the same preferences to WTO members.247 A further look at Article XXIV 
shows that Article XXIV permits the formation of international economic integrations as long 
as they follow principles of non-discrimination, transparency and reciprocity.248 Economic 
integration according to Article XXIV is also permissible if it removes all trade restrictions 
between members.249 These guidelines for an exception have been termed as interpreted quite 
loosely, and as a result no trading agreement has been rejected by GATT so far.250 Due to this 
exception the EU is therefore able to enter into preferential trade agreements with third parties. 
This same legislation allowed the UK to engage with developing countries and form economic 
relationships over the years. 
Since the Regional exception has been put in place there has been a boom in the WTO members 
entering into PTAs.251 The average WTO member is a party to at least thirteen preferential 
trade agreements.252 These trade agreements take the form of bilateral and multilateral 
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agreements and half of them are not strictly regional.253 Trade agreements have become more 
cross regional especially in the last few decades thus one finds that these agreements are now 
extending to developing countries.254  One of the main reasons for the proliferation of 
preferential trade agreements is that rather than providing completely free trade, PTAs provide 
preferential market access relative to a situation in which no such agreement exists.255 The 
PTAs are also in keeping with the rules of the WTO as they have a reciprocal element to them 
which also accounts for the proliferation of PTAs as will be discussed later in the chapter.256 
The PTA agreements of the WTO members with developing countries count for about the 
quarter of the average 36 agreements per member, with the rest being between the developed 
countries amongst themselves.257 The EU is currently party to more than 36 preferential trade 
agreements of which covering more than 60 developing countries, which the UK benefits from 
as an EU Member State.258 These statistics highlight the fact that as part of the EU, the UK has 
been in many PTAs with developing countries which may be affected. This therefore leads one 
to the point that many developing countries will be affected by the UK’s decision to opt out of 
the EU. While developing countries in Africa may not be part of the EU they are still affected 
by EU politics. 
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4.2.1 UK foreign policy with Africa under the EU  
EU-Africa relations are currently contained in the Cotonou Agreement and the Joint Africa-
EU Strategy, which both include political, economic and development dimensions.259 The 
Cotonou Agreement was preceded by the Lome Convention of 1975.260 The Lome Convention 
marked the beginning of a preferential trade relationship between the EU and the developing 
Africa. The Lome Conventions resulted in a preferential relationship between the EU and 71 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries.261 It is important to note that the chapter refers 
to the Lome Conventions because the Lome Convention was reviewed every year until it was 
replaced by the current Cotonou Agreement.262 The Lome Convention granted the ACP 
countries non-reciprocal trade preferences for the export of agricultural and mineral products 
duty free to the EU.263 The EU and the WTO waiver requirements soon desired a more 
reciprocal relationship, whereby ACP countries equally open their markets to EU exports thus 
the birth of the Cotonou.264 These agreements were not easily made considering that Africa as 
a developing continent is reluctant to liberalise its markets and some countries did not see the 
effectiveness of the existing trade agreements to their economies.265 
The Lome Conventions were replaced by the Cotonou on 23 June 2000. The Cotonou like the 
Lome Convention encompasses many counties.266 The Cotonou was created with the aim of 
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implementing change in the ACP countries and the EU through introducing the concept of 
reciprocity.  ACP countries were for the first time required to reduce their tariff barriers, both 
tariff and non-tariff barriers.267 At this point we start to see PTAs become more reciprocal as 
compared to the pre-existing free trade agreements. The ACP counties are now obliged to open 
up their markets to the EU. This however, is not to say that the Cotonou has not been subject 
to criticism from the WTO members on the basis of incompatibility with Article XXIV of the 
GATT 1947.268 This however is not the crux of this discussion though it is a very topical 
subject. 
In order to facilitate the negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), the 
ACP countries divided themselves into regional groupings under Article 37(5) of the Cotonou 
Agreement.269 These groupings manifest themselves in the form of six groups namely the 
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) consisting of Southern African countries 
and the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) constituting of countries from East Africa. The 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) constituting of West African 
countries is also one of the groupings emerging from the ACP countries, including the Central 
African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), a grouping of Central African 
countries. The Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM) made up of Caribbean countries and the 
Pacific Forum constitution of Pacific Countries is also one the groupings which sprung from 
the ACP counties. This research paper will look at the SADC group mainly. 
The EU-SADC agreement was signed on the 10th of June 2016 with Botswana, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa (SA).270 The other six SADC members 
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the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe were negotiating trade agreements with the EU as part of other regional groups 
namely Central Africa and South Africa.271 The EU is SADC’s largest trading partner with SA 
imports and EU exports making the largest chunk of the SADCs trade.272 It is important to note 
that SADC’s member states are also part of the WTO thus the EU was able to have a trading 
relationship with the SADC in the first place. 
The EU-SADC EPA brought improved opportunities for trade in goods for the SADC.273 The 
EPA guarantees access to the EU market without duties or quotas for the signing members 
Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia and Swaziland. The signatories will have duty free 
access to the EU market.274 SA’s access to the EU market is different as only 98.7% of the 
customs duties have been partly or wholly removed.275 It is important to note that while all the 
SADC members are signatories of the Cotonou Agreement between the ACP countries and the 
EU, SA was excluded from the trade agreements thereof because of its relatively higher level 
of development.276 SA had to sign a different agreement in the form of the Trade Development 
and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) which will be discussed more in the chapter shortly. EU 
therefore does not have the same level of access to the SADC EPA Member States’ markets it 
is rather dependent on whether the country is classified as a developing country or a least 
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developed country.277 EU access to the SADC is still restricted to a certain extent as SADC 
still has some tariffs and quotas in some areas of trade.278 One therefore notes a stark difference 
between the Lome Conventions and the new PTAs such as the SADC- EU as the new PTAs 
with the EU are characterised by reciprocal access to the markets of the signatories in return 
for access to the EU market. The agreement might not be equally affording access between the 
signatories as the EU offers more access than the SADC members yet there is an element of 
reciprocation. 
The above discussion was done in order bring out the fact that the UK has multiple trade 
relationships with developing countries in Africa under the EU. What the Brexit entails is that 
each one of these will be affected once the UK officially pulls out of the EU. This has led to 
uncertainty as to future UK-Africa trade relations. Until the final agreement is made Africa is 
in limbo and remains uncertain of its access to the UK market. 
4.2.3 UK trade relations with South Africa 
South Africa (SA) shares a trade relationship with the EU that is different to other African 
states. SA benefits from an additional trade agreement with the EU which is called the TDCA. 
The TDCA was concluded between the EU and SA in 1999.279 The TDCA was created with 
the aim of establishing a Free Trade Area (FTA) between SA and the EU.280 Through this 
agreement the EU gained meaningful access to the SA market. The EU eliminates tariffs on 
approximately 95% of goods traded while SA eliminates around 85% of its tariffs.281 This 
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relationship has allowed SA to grow its economy and is now one of the fastest growing and the 
largest economy in Africa.282 
As a signatory of the EU the UK has a number of PTAs with SA that may be affected by the 
impending Brexit. What this may entail is an end to the trade agreements between the UK and 
SA. This would result in the loss of market access to the UK by SA. Considering the 
downgrading of the SA rand to junk status this Brexit could not have come at a worse time and 
have a negative effect on the SA economy.283 However, this may be mitigated by putting 
forward an agreement for continued future trade even before the withdrawal agreement is 
finalised to avoid gaps in the economic sector. This would also put an end to the uneasiness 
followed by not knowing if the UK will propose a replacing trade agreement.   
However, the Brexit has been said by some to not have such a devastating blow on the TDCA. 
This is because while the EU is SA’s biggest trading partner totalling about 30% of SA’s total 
exports.284 Of this 30% UK trade counts for about 3.2% of that trade with Germany being the 
largest EU trading partner worth 7.2% of SA trade.285 Better yet new market opportunities have 
been presented to SA. Developing countries such as China, India and Brazil have captured 
some of SA’s total exports which according to Sandrey signal a move away from reliance on 
the EU.286 One may therefore argue that the Brexit is only propelling SA towards other trade 
parties outside of the EU. Considering that some have termed EU relationships as a dead horse, 
SA should now focus on emerging markets which provide more favourable deals as compared 
to the EU.287 While this is a very topical issue this chapter will not dwell on these arguments.  
                                                          
282 ‘South Africa-EU: A strategic partnership based on shared values and interests’ available 
at file:///C:/Users/hazy/Downloads/South%20Africa-
EU%20A%20strategic%20partnership%20based%20on%20shared%20values%20and%20int
erests'%20Opinion%20piece%20by%20President%20Zuma.pdf (accessed on 30/05/2017). 
283 Green J ‘Fitch downgrades SA to junk status’ 7 April 2017 Daily Maverick available at 
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-04-07-breaking-fitch-downgrades-sa-to-junk-
status/#.WTmGsGiGO00 (accessed on 30/05/2017). 
284 ‘SA's trade with the EU: Before Brexit’ available at 
http://www.southafricanmi.com/eusa.html (accessed on 02/06/2017). 
285 ‘SA's trade with the EU: Before Brexit’ available at 
http://www.southafricanmi.com/eusa.html (accessed on 02/06/2017). 
286‘Transportation DBE Advisory Committee (TDAC) Vdot / Richmond District Auditorium’ 
available at http://virginiadot.org/business/resources/TDAC_Minutes_6-13-2006.pdf 
(accessed on 02/05/2017). 
287 Mbatha C N “The Relevence of European Union-South African Trade and the TDCA 
from a perspective of South African’ s Agricultural exports between 1997 and 2008’ (2011) 
50 Agrekon 75-79. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
57 
 
Another reason that the Brexit may not have crippling effects is that the UK represents only a 
portion of EU. In essence SA only loses a part of the EU and not the whole EU market access. 
SA will still have access to the remaining 28 member states particularly Germany. However 
one can note that SA carries a greater burden of reciprocity towards the EU as compared to 
other African or developing countries in terms of the TDCA.288  However one cannot ignore 
the fact that South Africa due to its special relationship with the UK is one of the hardest hit 
African countries by the Brexit move. It is most affected as it has a relatively far reaching 
agreement with the UK through the TDCA. 
The above discussion shows that the UK has various trade agreements with developing 
countries in Africa and that these relations hang on a balance in the light of the Brexit. The 
chapter will now discuss the implications of the Brexit on developing countries in Africa and 
how the economic landscape may change in the light of trade relationships. 
4.3 Implications of the Brexit on developing countries in Africa 
 
Currently, the UK shares the EU’s trade policy, including its tariff levels, trade agreements, 
and preferences for poorer countries. The EU has an array of different agreements with 
different countries including the General System of Preferences (GSP) which offers reduced 
tariffs for a broad group of developing countries on around two-thirds of products, Free Trade 
Agreements (FTA) or Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and the Everything but Arms 
Agreement (EBA) to which the UK is currently a party to.289 As an EU member, the UK is part 
of 36 trade agreements which will remain in force until the conclusion of the withdrawal 
agreement.290 Post-Brexit, these trade agreements will need to be renegotiated.  Irrespective of 
the type of trade relationship negotiated with the EU, the UK may have to renegotiate all its 
                                                          
288 Mbatha C N “The Relevence of European Union-South African Trade and the TDCA 
from a perspective of South African’ s Agricultural exports between 1997 and 2008’ (2011) 
50 Agrekon 75-79. 
289 ‘World Trade Report 2011 The WTO and preferential trade agreements: From co-
existence to coherence’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report11_e.pdf  (accessed 
on 07/05/2017). 
290 ‘Chapter 7: The EU and preferential trade with third countries’ available at 
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeucom/129/12910.htm 
(accessed on 28/04/2017). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
58 
 
trade agreements with third countries. The exit of the UK from the EU is likely to have an 
impact on the developing countries. 
While the Brexit is the UK exiting from the EU on its own volition developing countries may 
be at the receiving end of a raw deal.291 Developing countries markets are affected by world 
trade fluctuations because they have little and in some cases no leverage at all over their export 
prices according to Broda.292 In practice wealthy first-world markets dictate the price of the 
goods that developing countries trade in.293 Contrary to developing countries, developed 
countries exert a substantial influence on export prices. In this instant developing countries in 
Africa have found themselves at the mercy of the world's economic giants and are affected by 
their decisions even though they never had a meaningful influence on world economic issues.   
There is uncertainty as to whether developing member states will be able to attain the same 
level of preferential treatment from the UK or the UK will offer less preferential treatments 
while taking a more aggressive trade policy.294 It is also an issue of concern as to what will 
happen to the developing counties markets before the UK can renegotiate trade agreements. 
There is fear that developing countries may lose their markets while the UK puts its house in 
order. It therefore becomes clear that while the UK is practising its right to leave the EU, 
leaving the EU has a ripple affect not only on the EU but also on developing countries in Africa. 
4.3.1 Loss of funding under the European Development Fund  
The UK has been one of the biggest contributors to the European Development Fund (EDF), 
the EU’s development assistance sector, which aids developing countries and regions through 
the provision of funds.295 Assisting the poorest countries, and among populations affected by 
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conflict, state fragility and climate change is the aim of the EDF.296 The EU upon recognising 
that trade is a more powerful tool for inclusive growth and poverty reduction than aid; the EU 
started the initiative of offering financial aid to the developing countries. The EU is by far the 
world’s largest provider of aid-for-trade.297 The UK as part of the EU currently contributes 
about £409 to £585 million making up 14.8 % of contributions to the EDF. The fund is one of 
the world’s largest providers of multilateral concessional aid, with pay-outs exceeding ones 
directed through the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA).298 The 
Brexit may result in the EU having fewer funds to put into the aid program. Contrary to this 
assertion, Watkins argues that while a Brexit would deprive the EDF of British resources for 
development assistance, the direct disbursement of aid, set to replace the UK’s contribution to 
the fund from the UK to recipient countries will have a narrower geographical reach than aid 
funnelled through the EDF.299 
Despite the size of the aid budget and the strong mandate on poverty reduction enshrined in the 
Lisbon Treaty, the EU is still failing to meet its targets on development assistance.  Economic 
giants such as Germany and France have failed to match the UK’s achievement of the 0.7% 
aid-to-GNI target. In fact, only five member states, including the UK, met the target in 2015.300 
To make matters worse, the share of EU aid going to sub-Saharan Africa and the least 
developed countries has been shrinking from an inadequate base.301 This gives rise to concerns 
as to whether the aid given to developing countries will significantly decline considering that 
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the UK one of the greatest supporters of the Aid programs are going to be officially out of the 
EU in two years.  
The UK has been leading the EU in the aid program thus having led by example the UK on the 
0.7% aid target, is well placed to call on others to follow suit.302 The UKs Brexit has now left 
a gaping hole in the aid programme. The UK’s commitment to continue spending 0.7% on aid 
may be abandoned if the fiscal position deteriorates and the government has to find further 
spending reductions, or wishes to switch public spending to programmes with a greater 
domestic multiplier to stimulate the economy.303 Depending on the political complexion of the 
government, this could result in substantial contraction of aid spending. Even if the 0.7% 
commitment is maintained, lower Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will reduce the aid 
budget compared to where it would have been.  The immediate effect of the depreciation of 
sterling anticipated upon the Brexit being finalised and a recession forecast given by many 
economists may lead to the depreciation in value of the UK aid programme. This may create 
short-term problems for organisations with local currency or dollar liabilities.304  
On the other hand the UK may now experience more pressing agendas not only internally as 
they also need to fill in the gaps where the EU had assisted.305 Consequently, the UK may leave 
the developing countries in the wind as they may prioritise more financially gratifying deals 
rather than the wellbeing of developing countries so as to cover the deficit of funds and EU 
assistance.306  
                                                          
302 Watkins K ‘What would a Brexit mean for EU development assistance?’ available at 
https://www.devex.com/news/what-would-a-brexit-mean-for-eu-development-assistance-
88265 (accessed on 28/04/2017). 
303 ‘Post-Brexit Trade and Developing countries: Can the UK set the Gold Standard in 
Development-Friendly Trade Policy?’ available at 
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/ff77712c-30ec-4950-97a0-
ebc62b106163/Olivie-Perez-EP-Possible-impacts-Brexit-EU-development-DEVE-
EP.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=ff77712c-30ec-4950-97a0-ebc62b106163 (accessed 
on 28/04/2017). 
304 Watkins K ‘What would a Brexit mean for EU development assistance?’ available at 
https://www.devex.com/news/what-would-a-brexit-mean-for-eu-development-assistance-
88265 (accessed on 28/04/2017). 
305 Springford J & Tilford S ‘The Great British trade-off The impact of leaving the EU on the 
UK’s trade and investment’ available at 
https://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2014/pb_britishtrade_
16jan14-8285.pdf (accessed on 20/05/2017). 
306 Springford J & Tilford S ‘The Great British trade-off The impact of leaving the EU on the 
UK’s trade and investment’ available at 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
61 
 
 
The loss of aid may however not be as bad as it is assumed to be considering that from 2014, 
the EU has been slowly phasing out direct aid to large countries such as India and other 
countries like Malaysia, SA and many Latin American countries.307 This process is called 
'graduation'. The funds are redirected to the poorest regions of the world. During the period 
2014-2020, it was proposed that about 75% of EU support will go to these countries which, in 
addition, often are hard hit by natural disasters or conflict, something that makes their citizens 
particularly vulnerable.308 The Brexit may therefore not be too hard on African countries as aid 
may be taken from those states which are now able to sustain their economies better and aid is 
now concentrated on those who need it the most.309 While some countries like Nigeria and SA 
whose economies are progressing faster may lose out on the aid program those who are in dire 
need will benefit. Therefore the deficit faced by the EU in terms of funds may be combated by 
redirecting the funds. 310 
Considering that the UK is one of the largest economies in the EU and contributes a substantial 
amount to the EU concerns about the impact of the Brexit on the EU budget has been lingering. 
However some scholars have found that the impact will be rather small. The UK may be 
expected to pay a rebate and contributing in order to obtain access to the EU market.311 The 
UK is likely to negotiate continued access to the EU market for which it will have to pay the 
tariffs for such access. These payments may well be able to make up for a measurable share of 
the funds the EU lost when the UK opted to leave the bloc.312 Therefore the Brexit may only 
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cause minimal losses which the remaining member states may be able to manage and work 
around. 
 
From the above discussion one notes that the Brexit has a negative effect on the poorest 
developing countries as they will automatically lose their duty-free, quota-free access to UK 
consumers and the liberalised rules of origin, which they currently get under the Everything 
But Arms (EBA) agreement and the European Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Market access 
to the UK will not automatically continue as usual once the UK leaves the EU. Alternatively, 
UK could make similar arrangements itself for some or all developing countries as will now be 
discussed by this mini thesis.313 Uncertainty about future access to the UK market has brought 
great uneasiness as it may mean the reduction of investments, growth and jobs in developing 
countries with PTAs with the UK. As a short term plan the UK has indicated that it intends to 
transfer EU provisions for developing countries into UK law. There has however been no 
ministerial statement to this effect. It is uncertain as to whether transporting EU law regarding 
developing countries is in fact legally permissible and whether developing countries will 
actually agree to this new venture.314 
4.3.2 Trading options for future UK-Africa trading relations  
Brexit means that EU legislation which was entrenched into the UK domestic policy is no 
longer subject to EU Treaties unless the withdrawal agreement stipulates otherwise.315 The UK 
faces the possibility of having gaps in their law if it does not create replacing legislation.316 
The UK may in a bid to cover those gaps, temporarily export EU law into their domestic system 
while creating desired legislation at a more relaxed pace rather than being forced to create 
meaningful legislation within the two-year exit period.317 The quality of the legislation would 
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be better if sufficient time is spent on creating the legislation. The UK’s PTAs with developing 
countries under the EU may also cease to exist once the UK repeals the European Communities 
Act. This may cause a huge blow on the developing countries’ economies.  
The UK has made it known that it is committed to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
and has long championed the benefits of trade as a driver of better living standards worldwide 
and intends to continue to do so.318 The UK is a significant export destination for products from 
some of the world’s poorest countries. Because of EU measures to benefit the poorest 
developing countries, many of these goods enter the UK tax-free. This helps their products 
remain competitive and supports decent livelihoods and working conditions, which are central 
to the SDGs.319 Once the UK, leaves the EU customs union and does not immediately put in 
place equivalent provisions then developing countries could lose out. Approximately £1billion 
in additional taxes could be added to imports from developing countries.320 This would 
significantly increase the costs of their products, potentially pushing farmers into poverty and 
increasing pressure on labour rights and wages. It is very important that UK continues to 
maintain its EU preferential trade arrangements with developing countries as it not only affects 
the developing countries but it can potentially have negative effects on the UK market. For 
example losing the preferential access would lead to higher duties on imports on those 
destination countries who would have lost access.321 
The UK is likely to take a more progressive approach in its foreign policy now that it is exiting 
the EU, covering areas that have been left out by the EU.322 This may include investment, 
services, government procurement and regulatory cooperation. There has also been an 
indication that the UK will also follow a more progressive approach in terms of its development 
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policy. It seems that the UKs work on international development via the Department for 
International Development (DFID) will focus more on trade that before.323 
It goes without saying that trade negotiations are time consuming and complex.324 Due to the 
complexity of PTAs the UK is now likely to focus on developing country PTAs that will deliver 
maximum benefit to the UK.325 The UK is therefore more likely to focus on countries where 
there are already FTA’s so as to secure the existing access to the markets of those countries 
enjoyed by the UK. One can therefore note that the UK is likely to negotiate new PTAs with 
the ACP countries in their various groupings rather than try and negotiate completely novel 
PTA agreements with new or single countries. The existing PTAs are therefore going to form 
a starting place for the new PTAs with the UK.326 
The UK government has signalled its desire to negotiate a range of FTAs with countries such 
as the US, Canada, China, Australia, India and Singapore.327 The UK while under the EU was 
not able to enter into trade agreements with these countries. By leaving the EU the UK is now 
free to enter into such agreements with the above mentioned countries. While this is a positive 
move for the UK in the sense that it is now able to expand its markets and can enter into 
unfettered agreements world-wide,328 the shockwaves of this move will be felt by developing 
countries. This is going likely to have a negative impact particularly where countries export 
similar products. For example, a trade deal with Australia would have significant implications 
for beef exporters in countries such as Namibia.329 What this could mean for Namibia is that 
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its products will lack competitiveness on the market considering that Australian farmers are 
granted some subsidies from their government.330 Subsidisation by the government means that 
the Australian products will be priced lower than the Namibian product due to the high costs 
of production. This means that developing countries may not be able to compete even though 
they may have access to the UK market which defeats the whole point of the PTA in the first 
place. 
It has been argued by some that the Brexit will in fact strengthen UK- Africa relations. This is 
yet to be seen considering that we do not yet know the UK foreign policy with regard to 
developing countries.  This view is based on the fact that the UK has supported developing 
countries interests in trade during its membership of the EU putting forward an anti-
protectionist policy. The UK now has a chance to rethink its trade policies with the developing 
countries.331 The UK is now free of the influence of the EU therefore can negotiate better trade 
deals with African nations, without the obligation to consider the interests of other EU member 
states.332 This may effectively result in the boosting of investment and opportunities especially 
for those working in the agriculture sector in Africa. Theresa May, has not yet addressed issues 
of the UK foreign policy with developing countries expressly but has committed to retaining 
an ‘open mind’ in respect of the UK's trading relationships post-Brexit.333 
There are alternatives for trade agreements for the UK and developing countries that serve the 
needs of the developing countries without disrupting their trade regime while the UK makes 
its grand exit from the EU. Instead of negotiating a new trade agreement the UK may 
immediately put in place a non-reciprocal tariff-free market access scheme for the 
economically vulnerable countries.334 By enabling tariff free imports from the developing 
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countries the UK would ease the pressure off of the developing countries and brings much 
needed stability to the developing countries. This could potentially bring more developmental 
changes than the EU. This system would improve existing EU provisions by incorporating 
more flexible rules of origin allowing developing countries to increase their share of exports.335 
Offering this non-reciprocal access would be a politically smart option for the UK. It would 
not require long drawn out negotiations or government resources and would ensure a continued 
relationship for developing country exporters and UK consumers. This would also be 
compatible with WTO rules of the MFN treatment and the UK would be joining a host of other 
leading economies including the USA, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Norway which 
operate similar schemes.336 However, duty free imports also mean higher competition with the 
domestic products which may in turn cause more harm to the economic growth of the UK as 
reflected in its GDP. This is an opportunity for the UK to improve on existing schemes and set 
the gold standard in development-friendly trade policy. 
4.3.3 Incentives for UK trading with Africa post Brexit 
The UK government has found itself in a position whereby it is under pressure to conduct 
reciprocal trade agreements with developing countries as soon as the UK leaves the EU. 
However, inadequately prepared trade agreements tend to struggle to deliver outcomes 
intended by the development objectives of the signatories.337 While many developing countries 
prioritise regional integration, market diversity, and the protection of their markets from 
vulnerability from the global price volatility, EU efforts to negotiate reciprocal deals have been 
found to pose a potential threat for developing countries.338 Chances are that these PTAs made 
in haste with the UK will be detrimental to the developing counties.339 Yet in their desperation 
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to retain access the UK the market, developing countries are likely to conclude those 
detrimental agreements especially the least developing countries.340 Worse still the EU’s so-
called EPAs have, in reality, been neither partnerships nor agreements in the strict sense.341 
This is because for example, the EPAs for both East and West Africa remain unsigned, after 
nine years of negotiations.342 The EU is now threatening to put up tariffs against African 
exports, as long as the agreements are not signed soon.343 The UK will on that basis be more 
than welcomed by developing nation leaders, if it proposes a different set of trade and 
development policies. In the same vain, despite resistance from developing countries the EU 
has insisted on significant liberalisation which threatens to undermine the development of 
developing countries, an ideal that the UK can take advantage of.344 While the desperation of 
Africa may prove beneficial to the UK, these agreements made in haste may look beneficial to 
Africa at face value but may be detrimental to developing countries in the long run. 
It has been noted that leaving the EU’s ACP arrangements would have implications for the 
UK’s ability to use trade as a tool of development policy.345 For example, the EU offered duty-
free access in certain products from ACP countries. If the UK reverted to WTO terms for trade 
with ACP countries, it would have to grant the same tariffs on those products on an MFN basis 
to all countries, unless it adopted a GSP scheme for developing and LDCs or signed FTAs with 
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these countries.346 In the absence of such preferential agreements, the UK would not have the 
privilege of choosing whom to grant preferential treatment. Instead the UK would be forced to 
grant all members of the WTO access to its markets.347 So one notes that in practice the UK 
although they have the option to renegotiate the PTAs with Africa this does not exactly mean 
that the UK can completely do away with the agreements with Africa. The UK may still be 
pushed by WTO legislation to grant some kind of preferential treatment to Africa.348 It 
therefore becomes apparent that it is better the UK comes to an agreement with developing 
countries on its own volition rather than be mandated to enter into agreements by the WTO. 
While advantageous to the UK it may also be beneficial to developing countries as it will ensure 
continued access to the UK market and possibly better deals than the existing ones. 
However, some scholars believe that instead of the UK having less influence it will actually 
have more influence than it did under the EU.349 This assertion is based on the premise that the 
UK has a rather progressive worldview. The UK during its time in the EU has pushed for 
European policies promoting a more open, liberalised trading system.350 The UK has also 
opposed agricultural subsidies, pushed for a more generous, effective, poverty-focused foreign 
aid programme. Therefore it will look less towards Europe and more towards the rest of the 
world. The absence of the UK in the EU as the protector of the rights of the developing 
countries to stand against issues such as agricultural production and export subsidies, and in 
favour of liberalisation of trade with developing countries, may cause EU trade policy to tip 
more towards protectionism and away from development-friendly trade policies.351  
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It is unclear what the Brexit deal will look like especially in the light of the rejection if the 
recent deal proposed by May and the chair of the EU referred to the UK as cherry picking.352 
May has been campaigning for a deal where the UK is out of the trade union and the single 
market. In a way she has been campaigning for a deal that is similar to the Norwegian systems 
while negotiating ‘mutual recognition’ of standards with the EU. She is campaigning for free 
trade agreements with European markets through a bold and ambitious deal.353 Consequently, 
allowing the UK to conclude trade agreements with emerging economies such as a China which 
they could not do so in terms of the EU agreement. May’s deal allows the UK to maintain 
existing trade relations yet allowing the UK to be in a position to trade with non EU members, 
enlarging its trade capacity. While this may spell better trade agreements for the emerging 
African States, it may also mean that they run the risk of being side tracked while the UK goes 
for better and mutually benefiting trade deals with faster growing economies such as China. 
This as mentioned above, may lead to the African products being booted from the market.  This 
is a result of these countries produce likely being less expensive due to the issue of subsidies 
which are almost non-existent in Africa.  
May’s deal has been rejected and campaigned against by the Labour party led by Jeremy 
Corbyn. The Labour party is campaigning that the UK remains in the customs union but 
renegotiate the emigration policies.354 This notion by the Labour party has been criticised as it 
could preclude the Government from concluding deals with other countries post Brexit.355 This 
could lead to the status quo when it comes to PTAs for developing countries in Africa 
remaining materially unchanged.  
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It is unclear what the Brexit deal will look like especially in the light of the rejection if the 
recent deal proposed by May and the chair of the EU referred to the UK as cherry picking.356 
May has been campaigning for a deal where the UK is out of the trade union and the single 
market. In a way she has been campaigning for a deal that is similar to the Norwegian systems 
while negotiating ‘mutual recognition’ of standards with the EU. She is campaigning for free 
trade agreements with European markets through a bold and ambitious deal.357 Consequently, 
allowing the UK to conclude trade agreements with emerging economies such as a China which 
they could not do so in terms of the EU agreement. May’s deal allows the UK to maintain 
existing trade relations yet allowing the UK to be in a position to trade with non EU members, 
enlarging its trade capacity. While this may spell better trade agreements for the emerging 
African States, it may also mean that they run the risk of being side tracked while the UK goes 
for better and mutually benefiting trade deals with faster growing economies such as China. 
This as mentioned above, may lead to the African products being booted from the market.  This 
is a result of these countries produce likely being less expensive due to the issue of subsidies 
which are almost non-existent in Africa.  
May’s  deal has been rejected and campaigned against by the Labour party led by Jeremy 
Corbyn. The Labour party is campaigning that the UK remains in the customs union but 
renegotiate the emigration policies.358 This  notion by the Labour party has been criticised as it 
could preclude the Government from concluding deals with other countries post Brexit.359 This 
could lead to the status quo when it comes to PTAs for developing countries in Africa 
remaining materially unchanged.  
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The above discussion shows that the future is rather uncertain and the UK has an array of 
options to choose from, any of which has the potential to affect developing countries either 
positively or negatively. At this point the ball is in the UK’s court and developing countries 
market access is in limbo.  
4.4 Conclusion  
The Brexit has had its fair share of implications on the UK, EU and developing countries. The 
UK entered into PTA agreements with developing countries under the EU therefore the rules 
of trade of the EU was exported and therefore applicable to the UK. The EU as a part of the 
WTO as bound to the MFN rule, which provides that a member of the WTO may not enter into 
preferential trade agreements exclusive of other WTO members. This rule is accompanied by 
an exception in terms of Article XXIV which allows a member to enter into preferential trade 
agreements if a benefit is attached. On the basis of that exception the EU was able to enter into 
PTAs with developing countries. The UK transacted with the ACP countries and the various 
groupings that they divided themselves into and an economic relationship was formed. 
The Brexit means that the PTAs signed by the UK and developing countries will come to an 
end, raising questions as to the implications of the Brexit to those trade agreements. Until the 
withdrawal agreement has been signed it is not possible to project what the implications may 
be for the developing countries. The UK may opt to retain the current agreements and continue 
with those agreements which may be advantageous to the developing countries as they get to 
maintain UK market access. However there is a possibility that the UK may not be willing to 
maintain preferential access to the development. The UK may opt to maintain access in only 
with economically beneficial circumstances which may work against the developing countries 
that rely on UK market access. Furthermore the Brexit leaves the EU and a financially weaker 
position which may result in developing countries having less aid which they desperately need. 
Chapter 5: Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
5.1 Overview 
The above mini thesis looks into the dynamics of the European Union (EU) and how the United 
Kingdom (UK) is now on its way out of the EU. The discussion is meant to discuss the exit of 
the UK from the EU which came at a time where there ware uncertainties regarding the 
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implementation of the exit procedure. While the Treaty of Lisbon provides for an exit exists it 
had never been used prior the Brexit thus there are a number of grey areas in the procedural 
implementation of the enabling legislation. The idea behind this study is to bring to light how 
Regional Integration may come to an end and how this may affect not only the leaving member 
state by the remaining member states and third parties. The EU has been the shining example 
for African Regional Integration for many years. Africa has been modelling the EU structure 
as they come up with their own Regional Integration structure customised to Africa. However 
the Brexit serves to show that the Supranational Regional system of the EU may come to end 
and that while integration is the goal, integration may not always be permanent. Should Africa 
be faced with members who would like to exit the Regional bloc, it is best that they prepare for 
such incidents. This discussion serves to remind Africa of the shortcomings of Regional 
Integration, the process of an exit from the bloc and the implications thereof.   
5.2 Conclusions  
 
It is impossible to speak to the Brexit without first looking at the history of integration. The 
EU was a creature of the Schuman declaration and was built over a period of time and a series 
of agreements.360 The EU was brought to life starting with the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) of 1951 which spoke of cooperation and later broadened to the economic 
monetary and political union it is today.361 With each treaty a greater level of cooperation was 
forged.  
The United Kingdom of Great Britain, which is made up of England, Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland made their entry into the EU in 1973 on the first enlargement.362 Even then 
the UK was divided internally about joining in the Regional Integration programme.363 Thus it 
has been noted by some historians that the UK had been distancing itself from the EU gradually 
over the years.364 The UK eventually held a referendum proposed by David Cameron, the 
former UK Prime Minister, for an exit from the EU for which the leave campaign won by a 
slim margin.365  The UK is currently on its way to an exit from the EU. 
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The exit clause, Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty was not always a part of the legislation of the 
EU. Prior to the inclusion of an express exit clause there are many arguments as to the 
possibility of a member state leaving the bloc.366 These arguments for the possibility of an exit 
prior the exit clause are based on customary international law in the form Article 62 of the 
Vienna Convention on the law of the Treaties (VCLT) and state sovereignty to name a few.367 
Proponents of the possibility of an exit also propose Protocol 36 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as a viable option that UK may use to leave the 
EU. A close look at Protocol 36 shows that the prescription of this provision ran out and 
Protocol 36 is no longer an avenue for exit. However, arguments against exit without an express 
clause were based on the fact that an exit from the bloc was never part of the design of the 
EU.368 With the coming of the enabling clause in the form of Article 50 these arguments were 
silenced. Thus the UK is using Article 50 as a tool for its exit.369 
Article 50 has been shown to be a seemingly short clause but is considered packed piece of 
legislation. In terms of Article 50 the exiting member state has to leave in line with its domestic 
constitutional requirements.370 The UK does not have a codified constitution; however it still 
has a constitutional body of law.371 It was also found that the June Referendum though 
important, it was not legally binding and was not the official trigger to the exit procedure. 
Rather the handing of the letter of intention to leave the EU to the European Council serves as 
the trigger of the exit procedure and the two year prescription.372 Even though the Referendum 
voted to leave, the Parliament still had to initiate the leave process. The constitutional 
requirements for the exit are that the exit must be initiated and led by the Parliament.373 The 
Parliament must agree upon the exit and create replacing legislation in terms of the Mille case. 
It became clear that it is not the invocation of the Royal prerogative by the Prime Minister that 
would set the exit procedure into motion.374  
Brexit has a myriad of implications not only on the UK but third parties as well. It is also 
important to note that the Brexit has been found to be at a crossroads with Scotland. Scotland 
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indicated in the referendum that it does not want to leave the EU and wants to maintain its 
relationship with the EU.375 Unfortunately Scotland was outvoted by the rest of the UK and 
may be forced to exit the EU against its will. Scotland has indicated that it may opt to leave the 
UK in order to maintain its relationship with the EU.376 This possibility raises many questions 
as to the future of the UK outside the EU.377 
There is a proverb that says when the elephants fight it is the grass that suffers.378 In the same 
way when the major economic powers fight it is the poorer developing countries that will 
suffer. In terms of third parties developing countries are most likely to be hit hard by the 
Brexit.379 This is because most developing countries in Africa are dependent on the aid 
provided by the EU to which the UK was a party to.380 The Brexit may result in a reduction of 
such aid therefore leaving the developing countries at a disadvantage. Developing countries in 
Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) with the UK will also be left at a disadvantage as the 
PTAs will come to the end when the withdrawal agreement is finalised.381 This leaves many 
questions as to the future relationship of the UK and these developing countries. The UK has 
indicated that it may offer developing countries PTAs as they were under the EU.382 There is a 
possibility that developing countries may not get the short end of the stick after all.383 It is 
important to note that while Theresa May may have not addressed issue of the UK foreign 
policy with developing countries, she has committed to retaining an open mind in respect of 
future trading relationships post-Brexit with African developing countries. This means that 
African trading relations with the UK will not simply be ignored but will be taken into account. 
This mini thesis is aimed at discussing the effects of the Brexit on the UK and developing 
countries, specifically those in Africa. The mini thesis therefore endeavoured to look into how 
Regional Integration was created, whether the exit procedure was readily available and what 
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the process of the exit is. The mini thesis furthermore looked closer at the exit procedure so as 
to come up with a clear synopsis of the effects that the Brexit will have on the UK and third 
parties. 
5.3 Recommendations  
 
1. The UK has in the past few months attempted to broker deals with some European 
countries with regard to their future preferential agreements.384 However this courtesy 
has not been extended to Africa. As a short term solution to combat the uncertainty and 
the continuing drop in exports, Africa in their regional blocks should approach the UK 
government and the EU for an agreement. The agreements should contain clauses 
detailing the future UK-African and EU-African developing countries future 
relationship with regard to preferential access to the UK market. The reason why Africa 
should Approach the UK in blocks is that it makes the negotiation process to go faster 
as compared to individuals seeking individual agreement. This is also time sensitive as 
it would be more beneficial for the developing African countries to seek the agreements 
even before the withdrawal period is done so as to secure their already struggling 
markets. The uncertainty does not do African countries any favours thus it is better to 
devise solutions as soon as possible. 
 
2. It would be wise that as Africa looks towards Regional Integration they use the example 
of Brexit and ensure that they do not omit to include a clear exit procedure. The Brexit 
is evident of the importance of state sovereignty. While the supranational organisations 
are good and bail out economies the issue of state sovereignty is important and every 
supranational organisation has the potential to lose members on the basis of the need 
for sovereignty. Therefore legislation must definitely be put in place to deal with that 
possibility. Unlike Article 50 that legislation must be clear on the process and procedure 
of such so as to clear out the grey areas. Issues such as the exiting member remaining 
in decision making position should however be reviewed. It is better that once the 
intention to leave has been granted the exiting member ceases to make decisions on the 
future of the bloc to avoid a conflict of interest and the exiting country putting in place 
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decisions to its advantage thus ensuring continued benefit from a bloc it does not want 
to be a part of. Another important area is that of increasing the exit period from 2 to 4 
years to ensure meaningful agreements actually being made. Africa as it looks into 
creating a regional bloc should take this into cognisance.    
 
3. It is apparent that third parties are affected by the decision to move out of the EU bloc, 
however, unlike the members of the EU these third parties are not given an opportunity 
to discuss an exit plan. In future an exit arrangement for the affected third parties must 
be put in place so as to avoid economic losses caused by uncertainty. The exiting 
member must be forced to hold these discussions with the affected parties concurrently 
with the exit period in the EU bloc. This strategy may also be taken into cognisance by 
the African leaders as they look deeper into Regional Integration. 
 
4. The UK as an activist of the development aid programme should provide opportunities 
for the development of developing African countries for access into their 
markets.385 Africa may prove itself to be an ally in the future. While Africa's exports 
are almost insignificant as compared to the rest of the world, the UK has been 
facing trade diversion in the past months as a result of the Brexit. Other European states 
would now rather directly import goods rather than take them from the UK. Africa on 
the other hand is ready and willing to trade with the UK.  In order to cut the renegotiation 
period short the UK may carry over the existing preferential trade agreements until the 
Brexit has been completed. The UK may customise and improve these agreements at a 
much more relaxed pace after the Brexit is complete and there is less pressure on the 
government to act at such a rapid pace. 
 
5. A recommendation for the EU is that Brexit does not spell the end of the EU but should 
be taken rather as a speed bump that calls for structural change within the EU. This is 
because the remaining member states have a lot more to lose than gain by exiting the 
EU. In the same way Scotland is trying to hold on to the single market, the remaining 
member states are also dependent on the single market. The EU therefore needs a more 
flexible and transparent rule structure, allowing proper checks and balances within the 
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bloc. The EU has a lot of benefits yet statistics show that the ordinary person is unaware 
of these benefits. This calls for educational campaigns aimed at educating the ordinary 
people of the role and function of the EU in the economy. This will help to lower the 
rising level of EU scepticism which was very prevalent in the Brexit. 
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